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Abstract 
This paper discusses the application of the containment strategy in combating terrorism in North East Nigeria. 
To achieve this aim, secondary data in the form of written texts, journal articles, newspaper reports and internet 
webpages are utilized. This research is pertinent for the Nigerian Armed Forces is yet to discover a befitting 
strategy at quelling terrorism in the north east region. Also, the retrogressing effects of the current strategy 
adopted by the Nigerian government makes the findings of this work a compelling alternative to the existing 
strategy. A detailed hypothesis on how the containment strategy can be applied in the north east region has been 
attempted in this work. There is, however, a necessity for further needs analysis and more specific and elaborate 
study by strategists and tacticians of the Nigerian armed forces to weigh the potency, strength, weakness, the 
opportunity cost and the threats of this idea in regard to the general and peculiar Boko Haram conflict context. 
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1.0 Introduction: Terrorism in Nigeria and the Boko Haram Escapades, 1995-20171 
Terrorism in Nigeria, it appears, is not novel as the Boko Haram menace has made it appear. Indeed, 
there are traces and actions in the past of which “fear” was utilized for religo-political gains. Terrorism in Africa 
as well as Nigeria dates back to the era of slavery where violence was employed in the efforts to exploit human 
resources from the 15th to the 19th century by European capitalists2. Slavery and the means through which slaves 
were acquired were brutal phenomena. This trade culminated in several deaths, arson, extinction of communities 
and settlements, internecine wars, banditry, kidnappings, torturing and other violent crimes. 
 The second wave of terrorism in Nigeria was a product of the illegal clamp down on Nigeria’s empires, 
kingdoms and chiefdoms by colonialists. What is popularly termed “gunboat diplomacy” in contemporary 
literatures is nothing other than a premeditated terror strategy by the colonial overlords aimed at instilling fears 
and exploiting such scenario for their selfish political gains. As observed by Paul Omeje, not less than 30,000 
persons were killed in an onslaught by the British at Sokoto in 19033. The terrifying naval vessels and the 
epitome of terror – the Maxim Guns, were more often than not, used against Nigerian belligerents armed with 
bow and arrow. One wonders what could be more terrific and what political motive could be more conspicuous 
than colonialism. 
 The third wave of terrorism was still perpetrated by the colonial masters. As observed by Bukola 
Oyeniye, colonial rule in Nigeria, dragged down by the need for legitimacy and acceptability, depended on the 
use of force and the deployment of terror to enforce its policies4. For instance, 18 and 31 unarmed women at Utu 
Etim Ekpo and Ikot Abasi (both in present Akwa Ibom State) respectively, were murdered by colonial overlords 
in 1929 for resisting alien taxation5. This was nothing but a premeditated horror inflicted as a choreography of 
deterrence against further uprisings. Similarly, when the socio-cultural group Oku-Ogun resisted colonial 
taxation, mandatory building of pit latrines and imposed Alaafin suzerainty, the colonial government engaged the 
                                                          
1This subhead borrows from the paper the author presented at 1stNAHISS Conference held at the Faculty of Arts 
Auditorium University of Calabar, Calabar - Nigeria, September, 2016; titled “Between Counterterrorism, 
Human Rights and National Security: The Nigeria’s Government Dilemma”. 
2Abubakar Yahaya, “Analysis of the Economics of Terrorism in Nigeria: Boko Haram and Movement for 
Emancipation of Niger Delta in Perspective”. Unpublished MA thesis, Institute of Graduate Studies and 
Research, East Mediterranean University, (2015).p.30. 
3Paul U. Omeje, “Nationalism and Indigenous Resistance to Alien Rules in West Africa”. In Paul U. Omeje & U. 
U. Okonkwo (eds) New Perspective in West African History. (Enugu: Madonna University Press, 2013).p.370. 
4Bukola A. Oyeniye, “A Historical Overview of Domestic Terrorism in Nigeria”. In Wafula Okumu & Anneli 
Botha (eds) Domestic Terrorism in Africa: Defining, Addressing and Understanding its Impact on Human 
Security.(Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2007).p.43. 
5Monday E. Noah, “The Role, Status and Influence of Women in Traditional Times: The Example of Ibibio of 
South Eastern Nigeria”. Nigerian Magazine, (Vol.53, No.4, 1985).p.28. 
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local people in a 3 year orgy of violence that cost 10,000 lives. Surprised attacks, guerilla-style bush actions and 
unprecedented terror were unleashed to break the resistance; “today’s Nigerian domestic terrorism is rooted in 
the sanctioned terrorism of its colonial powers”1. 
Among the socio-cultural groups that survived pre-colonial Nigeria, Awopa and Ogboni (Osugbo), 
continued clandestine and extraneous deviant behaviours. During the colonial era and well into the independence 
period, the Ogboni and other groups, like Awopa, became famous for killings, lootings armed robbery, pervasion 
of justice and so on. Awopa is known to have rained terror on Lagos and other suburban centres during the first 
republic and later independence2. 
The year 1986 marked a watershed on the history of violent and terror related crimes in Nigeria. The 
killing of Mr. Dele Giwa by a “Letter Bomb” in October, 1986 marked the beginning of violent killing and use 
of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in Nigeria. Subsequently, the Movement for the Advancement of 
Democracy (MAD) hijacked a Nigerian Airways aircraft in October, 1993, and just a year later, a vicious bomb 
blast ripped Shed 6 of Ilorin Stadium3.  
Moreso, the economic downturn and rising inflation rate during the Ibrahim Babangida’s regime made 
crime and criminal activities rampant. As police were either overwhelmed, or culpable to abating crime, ethnic 
militias such as O’odua People’s Congress (OPC), Arewa Youth Consultative Forum (AYCF), Movement for the 
Actualization of Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), Anambra State Vigilante Service, Niger Delta Volunteer 
Force (NDVF), Ogoni Youth, Ijaw Youth, Bakassi Boys, Egbesu Boys, Onitsha Traders Organization, Mambilla 
Militia Group etc. were formed. These groups which started as vigilante groups ended up being nightmare and 
menace to the localities they operated. Between 1999 and 2005, OPC was responsible for about 3,635 deaths; 
Bakassi Boys were responsible for over 14,000 deaths; AYCF was responsible for about 1,680 deaths; Mambilla 
was blamed for over 709 deaths; NDVF had questions to answer over 2,080 deaths; Egbesu Boys were 
responsible for 2,163 deaths; while MASSOB was responsible for some 1,179 deaths. These groups together 
facilitated the deaths of over 25,000 persons during this period4. 
Trends of terrorism in Nigeria with religious undertone could be traced back to 14th century arrival of 
Islam to the country’s empire of Borno and its attainment of legitimacy under Idris Aloma (1571-1603). 
Radicalization came in 1804, when Usman Dan Fodio waged a Fulani “so called Jihad” against the Hausa 
kingdoms with their syncretistic beliefs and infidel customs5. As a member of the Qadiriyya order, Dan Fodio’s 
version of Islam was still very far from purism of the Wahabiyya, the Saudi sect that kick-started international 
political Islamism in its well known current fundamentalist form. The latter permeated Nigeria only in the 1960s 
through the effort of Abubakar Gummi, Grand Kadi of northern Nigeria, friend and ally of Saudi Arabia, aided 
by the famous northern Nigerian politician, the Sarduana of Sokoto, Sir Ahmadu Bello6. 
In retrospect, Sharia was almost entirely done away with in northern Nigeria by the early 1960s as part 
of the “1960 Settlement” – a concession for a united independent Nigeria. However, Sir Ahmadu Bello (Son of 
Usman Dan Fodio) reneged on the north’s agreement by leading a contingent who aspired a return to Sharia as 
the legal basis for Muslims, and even Nigerian societies7. The resultant nostalgia culminated in the birth of 
Jama’at Izalat al-Bida wa Iqamat al-Sunnah (Society for the Eradication of Evil Innovations and the 
Reestablishment of the Sunnah), better known as the Izala Movement; a group whose raison d’être was religious 
revival and much public and political role for Islam. It was joined by several other religious movements, 
including the Muslim Student’s Society of Nigeria (MSS), widely regarded as a platform for young radical 
preachers, and the Islamic Movement of Nigeria, a more radical offshoot of the MSS better known as the 
Muslim Brotherhood, or Zakzaky, after its leader8.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1Oyeniye, “A Historical Overview of Domestic Terrorism in Nigeria”.p.44.  
2Oyeniye, “A Historical Overview of Domestic Terrorism in Nigeria”.p.45.  
3Don John O. Omale, “Terrorism and Counterterrorism in Nigeria: Theoretical Paradigms and Lessons for Public 
Policy”. Canadian Social Sciences, (Vol.9, No.3, 2013).pp.96-103.  
4Oyeniye, “A Historical Overview of Domestic Terrorism in Nigeria”.p.48. 
5Janos Besenyo & Adam Mayer, “Boko Haram in Context: The Terrorist Organization’s Root in Nigeria’s Social 
History”. Defense Against Terrorism Review, (Vol.7, No.1, 2015).p.50.  
6Besenyo, “Boko Haram in Context: The Terrorist Organization’s Root in Nigeria’s Social History”.p.50. 
7 Blessing Tangban, “Boko Haram: A Theoretical and Historical Analysis of Insurgency in Nigeria”. 
Unpublished MA Thesis, Southern University, New Orleans, (2014).p.26. 
8
“Curbing Violence in Nigeria (II): The Boko Haram Insurgency. Crisis Group Africa Report, (No216, 
2014).p.8. 
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Table 1: Groups and Casualty Rate, 1999-2005 
 
Group Region 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Total No. of Deaths 
OPC South West 1,800 620 350 420 230 110 105 3,635 
Bakassi Boys 
(Anambra) 
South East 900 820 920 450 620 910 805 5,425 
Bakassi Boys (Abia) South East 800 900 960 833 800 920 400 5,613 
Bakassi Boys (Imo) South East 600 680 520 624 350 250 190 3,232 
Arewa Youth Consultative Forum Northern Nigeria  120 700 320 110 125 180 125 1,680 
Mambilla Middle Belt 80 210 78 96 102 89 54 709 
NDVF Niger Delta  200 350 500 350 200 180 300 2,080 
Ijaw Youth  Niger Delta  300 700 560 183 230 120 70 2,163 
MASSOB Eastern Nigeria  50 300 230 180 217 80 122 1,179 
Total   4,850 5,280 4,438 3,264 2,874 2,839 2,171 25,716 
Source: Bukola A. Oyeniye, “A Historical Overview of Domestic Terrorism in Nigeria”. In Wafula Okumu & 
Anneli Botha (eds) Domestic Terrorism in Africa: Defining, Addressing and Understanding its Impact on 
Human Security.(Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2007).p.84 
 
The 1979 success of the Shiite militants in toppling the Iranian government was also a motivating factor 
for Muslim fanatics such as Zakzaky who introduced a militant pro-Iranian Shiite version of Islam into northern 
Nigeria in the 1980s1. Subsequently, characters like Mohammed Marwa emerged in the 1980s with radical and 
bizarre sermons against western culture and its popularity in Nigeria. Marwa was so violent that he became 
known as Maitatsine (the one who damns). Marwa’s exploits culminated in the 1982 brutal onslaughts that 
claimed 4,000 lives including that of Maitatsine himself 2 . His followers regrouped and rose against the 
government again same year in Bulumkutu and 3,300 persons were killed. In 1984, it rose again in Gongola 
State and 1,000 persons suffered casualty. Hundreds more were killed in 1985 in yet, another uprising in 
Bauchi3. 
In 1999, Nigeria’s status as a secular country came into a state of limbo when the constitution opened 
an avenue for the “imposition of Sharia by granting significant powers to the states and creating a system of 
appellate courts to hear appeals from Sharia trial courts”4. Members of the northern elites reacted swiftly and 
                                                          
1 Mike Omilusi, “From Child Wandering to Guerilla-Warriors: Islamic Extremism and the Boko Haram 
Recruitment in Northern Nigeria”. International Journal of Research in Social Sciences and Humanities, (Vol.5, 
No.IV, 2015).p.98. 
2Tangban, “Boko Haram: A Theoretical and Historical Analysis of Insurgency in Nigeria”.p.24.  
3Tangban, “Boko Haram: A Theoretical and Historical Analysis of Insurgency in Nigeria”.p.25. 
4Tangban, “Boko Haram: A Theoretical and Historical Analysis of Insurgency in Nigeria”.Pp.28. 
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introduced Sharia in Nigerian states (first in Zamfara back in 1999 and later in every other northern state except 
Adamawa)1. 
That single mistake of rejuvenating the Sharia system has lived to hunt the Nigerian state. Nigeria is 
now wrestling its sovereignty and territorial integrity with a dreaded Sharia inspired group which quotes the 
Quran and Sunnah before wrecking havoc and terror.    
The Boko Haram sect is reported to have surfaced under a different number of appellations including 
Shabaab Muslim Youth Organization, Ahlulsunna wal’Jama’ah hijra, Yusufiyya, Hijra Ummah, Jamaatul Takfur 
Wal Hydra Ahlus Sunna, Khawaarji, and Nigerian Taliban. These cognomens have been accorded them in the 
years 1995, 1999, 2000, 2002, and 20032. 
The word “boko” is popularly used to denote the formal educational system in Nigeria, but its specific 
meaning is disputed. According to some, “boko” in classical Hausa language literally means “deception” or 
“deceits”. It is used to describe the formal educational system because in the colonial period, this system was 
associated with Christian missionaries and seen as a disguise for evangelism and western beliefs. Others consider 
the word “boko” as a corruption of the English word “book” which is also associated with western education and 
culture. The word “haram” is adopted from Arabic, and usually means sins or forbidden3. 
As observed by Olaide Aro, element of Boko Haram has been in existence right from the 1960s4. 
However, conspicuous activities by the group began in 1995 as Shabaab under the leadership of Lawan 
Abubakar, who later left for Saudi Arabia to further his Islamic studies5. The absence of Lawan Abubakar 
culminated in the emergence of Muhammed Yusuf who was recognized by the Shakyhs Committee as its leader 
in 19996. 
Yusuf, a new leader of the group, had a previous history of activism within the Islamist movement 
known as Jama’at Tajdid al-Islam (JTI), a protest movement that had been active in the late military era7. Yusuf 
himself was inspired by a Saudi scholar Sheikh bin Abdullah Abu Zayd who in his book Westernization of 
Education in the Land of Islam condemned western education 8 . As a non-conformist, Muhammed Yusuf 
preached against practicing Islam with complacency and assiduously called for the return to orthodox Islam 
through the implementation of Sharia. Yusuf’s Philosophy was archaic and anti western. During an interview 
with the BBC, Yusuf berated that: 
 
there are prominent Islamic teachers who have seen and understood that the present western-
style education is mixed with issues that run contrary to our beliefs in Islam…Like rain, we 
believe it is the creation of God rather than evaporation caused by the sun that condenses and 
become rain. Like saying the world is sphere; if it runs contrary to the teachings of Allah, we 
reject it. We also reject the theory of Darwinism9.   
 
Yusuf’s radicalism fetched him over 280,000 followers across Nigeria, Chad and Niger Republic10.  
 Between the years 2000 and 2002, Osama bin Laden is reported to have issued two audio messages 
calling on Nigerian Muslims to wage a Jihad and establish an Islamic state. Laden’s interest in Nigeria dates 
from his 1992-1996 stay in Sudan where he reportedly met one Mohammed Ali, a Nigerian from Maiduguri 
studying at the Islamic University in Khartoum who became his disciple and was trained in Afghanistan. 
Accordingly, bin Laden asked him to organize a cell in Nigeria with a N300 million budget. Ali returned home 
                                                          
1Besenyo, “Boko Haram in Context: The Terrorist Organization’s Root in Nigeria’s Social History”.Pp.50. 
2 Samuel Oyewole, “Boko Haram and the Challenges of Nigeria’s War on Terror”. Defense and Security 
Analysis, (Vol.29. No.3, 2013).Pp.255. 
3Emilie Oftedal, “Boko Haram – an Overview” FFI-rapport, (2013/01680, 2013)Pp.13. 
4Olaide I. Aro, “Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria: Its Implication and Way forwards towards Avoidance of 
Future Insurgency”. International Journal of Scientific and Research Publications, (Vol.3, No.11, 2013).p.1. 
5 Abdulmajeed H. Bello, “Boko Haram: The Greatest Security Threat to the Sovereignty of Nigeria”. 
International Journal of Management and Social Science Research, (Vol.2, No.2, 2013).p.67. 
6Oyewole, “Boko Haram and the Challenges of Nigeria’s War on Terror”.p.255. 
7Andrea Brigaglia, “The Volatility of Salafi Political Theology, the War on Terror and the Genesis of Boko 
Haram”. Diritto e questioni Publiche, (Vol.15, No.2, 2015).p.180. 
8 Marc-Antoine Perouse de Montclos, “Nigeria’s Interminable Insurgency? Addressing the Boko Haram 
Crisis”.CHATHAM HOUSE, (2014).p.6-7. 
9 Joe Boyle “Nigeria’s ‘Taliban’ Enigma”. BBC News, (2009). Available [at] 
www.news.bbc.co.uk/2/ni/africa/8172270.stm. Accessed 22/07/2016. 
10Oyewole, “Boko Haram and the Challenges of Nigeria’s War on Terror”.p.255. 
Public Policy and Administration Research                                                                                                                                       www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-5731(Paper) ISSN 2225-0972(Online) 
Vol.8, No.7, 2018 
 
71 
in 2002 and began funding religious activities of Salafi groups that were unaware of the plan1. Mohammed 
Yusuf allegedly benefited from this programme2. 
 Coincidentally, Yusuf in 2002 established a religious complex with a mosque and an Islamic boarding 
school in Maiduguri in Borno State. This, according to Besenyo & Mayer, marked the commencement of the 
Boko Haram sect3. Up to July, 2009, Boko Haram had no official name for itself. It referred to itself as dawah, 
identified its mission as a return to the Ahlus Sunnah wal Jam’a (Adherents to the Sunnah and the Community of 
Muslims) and referred to its members as “brothers”. The first reference to its current preferred name of Ahlus 
Sunnah liddawa’ati wal Jihad came in the aftermath of the Bauchi prison break in September4, 2010. 
 However, Boko Haram violent confrontation and threat against national security dates back to 2003. At 
Zagi-Biriri, Yanusari local government, in Yobe State, sect members beat up a pregnant woman who had 
challenged their fishing rights in local ponds. This and other criminal attacks provoked reprisal actions from the 
police forcing the sect to relocate to Kanama where it used as a base for their resurgent and subsequent razing of 
police station, local government secretariats, lodges, and residents of local government chairman and divisional 
police officer (DPO) in December, 20035. Towards the end of 2004, activities of Boko Haram attained a shift in 
paradigm as there was a swift movement from direct confrontation to covert actions. 
 The threat posed by Boko Haram on Nigeria’s security maturated in 2006 when Nigerian security forces 
noticed that Boko Haram members were training in the Sahel alongside Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb 
(AQIM), with its emir Abdelmalek Droukdel confirming that his group had Nigerian elements in its midst in 
20086. By 2009, Boko Haram sect became very radical and called for Sharia law for the entire Nigeria, pushed 
for ethnic cleansing and demanded that Igbos and other Christian elements that populate the Sabon Gari of each 
northern town leave, and never return7. The sect became ultra-violent when its members refused to adhere to a 
new law in 2009 which required people to wear helmet when riding a motorcycle8. Over 1,000 persons were 
violently murdered in the ensuing chaos across the northern states of Bauchi, Borno, Katsina and Yobe9. 
 After the motorcycle clash with Borno state police, Muhammed Yusuf became angered and wrote his 
famous tirade entitled An Open Letter to the Federal Government which he threatened the government and urged 
them to respond within forty days, with a view to a resolution between the government and the group, if not, the 
Jihad operation will begin in the country which only Allah can stop it10. The Nigerian army reportedly launched 
an offensive attack on the Boko Haram leader Muhammed Yusuf’s compound which claimed more than 1,000 
lives on both sides with over 700 persons killed in Maiduguri11. At this time, scores of Boko Haram leaders as 
well as prominent financial backers such as Al-haji Buji Foi, a former commissioner for religious affairs in 
Borno State, were killed12. In what appeared to be a bizarre and preposterous action, Yusuf, along with his 
father-in-law Baa Fugu and other sect members were publicly executed on July 30, 2009 outside the police 
station in Maiduguri13. 
 The death of Yusuf, and the mass killings and arrests culminated in the sect retreating and re-
strategizing in two different ways – first was the adoption of Yusuf’s hard-line deputy, Abu-Muhammed 
Abubakar Ibn Muhammed al-Shakwi (Abubakar Shekau), alias Darul Tawheed as its new spiritual leader. 
                                                          
1
“Curbing Violence in Nigeria (II): The Boko Haram Insurgency. Crisis Group Africa Report,p.23. 
2Ryan Mauro, “Boko Haram: Nigerian Islamist Group”. Special Report, The Clarion Project, (n.d).p.2.  
3Besenyo, “Boko Haram in Context: The Terrorist Organization’s Root in Nigeria’s Social History”.p.48. 
4Kyari Mohammed, “The Message and Methods of Boko Haram”. In Marc-Antoine Perouse de Montclos (ed) 
Boko Haram: Islamism, Politics, Security and the State of Nigeria. (Leiden: African Studies Centre, 
2014).pp.13-14. 
5Oyewole, “Boko Haram and the Challenges of Nigeria’s War on Terror”.p.256. 
6Olivier Guitta & Robin Simox, Terrorism in Nigeria: The Threat From Boko Haram and Ansura. (London: The 
Henry Jackson Society, 2014).p.6. 
7Besenyo, “Boko Haram in Context: The Terrorist Organization’s Root in Nigeria’s Social History”.Pp.54. 
8Brian De Smet, “Dealing With Boko Haram”. Brussels School of International Studies, University of Kent, 
(2014).p.5. 
9Freedom C. Onuoha, “(Un)Willing to Die: Boko Haram and Suicide Terrorism in Nigeria”. Report, Al Jazeera 
Centre for Studies, (2012).p.4. 
10 Salisu S. Shuaibu & Mohd A. Salleh, “A Historical Evolution of Boko Haram in Nigeria: Causes and 
Solutions”. International Conference on Empowering Islamic Civilization in the 21st Century, (2015).p.219. 
11Shuaibu, “A Historical Evolution of Boko Haram in Nigeria: Causes and Solutions”.p.219. 
12Abdi O. Shuriye & Shittu Huud, “Global Challenge of Mutual Suspicion: Boko Haram Uprising in Nigeria”. 
American International Journal of Contemporary Research, (Vol.3, No.5, 2013).p.109. 
13 Konye O. Ori, “Conceptualizing Boko Haram Victimage, Ritual and the Construction of Islamic 
Fundamentalism”. Unpublished MA thesis, Department of Communication Studies, Indiana University, 
(2013).p.3. 
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Second was the redefinition of its tactics, which involved perfecting its traditional hit-and-run tactics, such as 
placement of improvised explosive devices (IEDS), targeted assassination, drive-by shooting and suicide 
bombings1. 
 In 2010, the Boko Haram sect set hundreds of prisoners free from a prison in Bauchi. In December, they 
detonated bombs that killed 80 people in Jos. On the New Year’s Eve of 2010, they attacked targets at Abuja for 
the first time. From 2010 onwards, they turned Maiduguri into veritable battle fields. When President Jonathan 
was reelected in 2011, they attacked churches, markets, Igbo owned shops, bars, beauty parlours and conference 
halls in Yobe and Borno States2. On June, 2011, the sect mounted the first ever suicide bombing at the police 
headquarters in Abuja. On April 26, 2011, another suicide bomber attacked the UN building in Abuja, killing 23 
people3. By January, 2012, the Nigerian media started talking about the new civil war. Seemingly, there were 
kidnappings and murder of westerners, prison mutinies, and suicide bombings at churches. In October, 41 
university students were butchered in Mubi. In 2012 alone, Boko Haram killed about 1,200 people. By May, 
2013, the cumulative number of people killed by Boko Haram had already exceeded 4,000. Boko Haram sect 
also developed it foreign policy stands and its international linkages4. 
The strength of the dreaded Boko Haram sect grew from 4,000 members in 2009 to between 6,000 and 
8,000 in 2014 against 15,000 soldiers deployed5. The sect also became audacious to place posters at key road 
intersections in some states in Nigeria, cautioning the general public to refrain from siding with the Nigerian 
government6. Again, the sect pulled down the Nigerian flag and raised that of Afghanistan in one of the states’ 
building it occupied7. By 2014, the female populations were incorporated into suicide bombings. In the next 16 
months, 90 female bombers killed over 500 people and injured over 700 more8. The situation was deteriorating 
as a woman apprehended in 2014, confessed that Boko Haram had unleashed 50 female bombers with plans to 
kill 100,000 by the end of 20149. 
 From May, 2011 through December, 2014, Boko Haram killed more than 8,400 persons; another 7,900 
were killed in fighting between the sect and Nigeria’s security forces10. There were about 330 attacks between 
January and June, 2014 with 4,483 fatalities11. While Augustine Eneanya12 places the total casualty from terror 
and suicide attack at the total number of 4,066, Onuoha & Temilola13 situates the death toll at 13,674 with a 
record 7,711 deaths in 2014 alone. Thousands have also been kidnapped and sold with the Chibok School Girls 
reportedly sold to Boko Haram militants for as little as $12 each14. Borno State has been worst hit with 3,422 
assassination cases between 2002 and 201415. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1Onuoha, “(Un)Willing to Die: Boko Haram and Suicide Terrorism in Nigeria”.p.2. 
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3Onuoha, “(Un)Willing to Die: Boko Haram and Suicide Terrorism in Nigeria”.p.5. 
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5 Marc-Antoine Perouse de Montclos, “Nigeria’s Interminable Insurgency? Addressing the Boko Haram 
Crisis”.p.15. 
6Benjamin Maiangwa, “State Fragility and the Reign of Terror in Nigeria: A Case Study of Boko Haram 
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2015).p.19. 
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14Gail Commandeur, “An Analysis of the Sexual Exploitation of Yazidi Women by Islamic State of Iraq and 
Syria (ISIS) and Christian Women by Boko Haram: Spoils of War, Holy War, or Instrumental Gains?”. Special 
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Table 2: Summary of Insecurity in Borno State  
 
Year Theft Armed 
Robbery 
Kidnapping Assassinations Fraud 
2002 9127 81 27 124 243 
2003 6796 95 34 210 349 
2004 5231 121 91 214 337 
2006 3124 134 95 313 410 
2007 7289 114 53 225 349 
2008 6111 171 58 320 298 
2009 1901 243 34 221 349 
2010 1082 273 53 318 343 
2011 3927 339 62 320 289 
2012 3702 289 76 417 319 
2013 9774 212 77 319 332 
2014 2254 210 84 421 298 
Total  64,045 2,282 744 3,422 3,916 
Sources: Charas M. Tella, “Insecurity in Northern Nigeria: Causes, Consequences and Resolutions” 
International Journal of Peace and Conflict Studies, (Vol.2, No.4, 2015).p.33. 
 
 As observed by Lauren P. Blanchard, the area affected by Boko Haram is home to an estimated 30 
million people. Aside from the wanton killings, the violence has caused a humanitarian emergency around Lake 
Chad, displacing more than 2.8 million and cutting off humanitarian access to roughly 3 million others. More 
than 5.6 million people in the region are in need of emergency food aid. Nearly 1.6 million displaced Nigerians 
have fled Borno. The violence has also forced more than 2,000 schools to close thereby, disrupting education. 
More than 15,000 people have been killed by the group since 2009 – including more than 6,500 in 2015 alone1.  
                                                          
1Lauren P. Blanchard, “Nigeria’s Boko Haram: Frequently Asked Questions”. Congressional Research Service, 
(2016).pp.4-5. 
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 The devastation caused and the sophistication of this group cannot be overemphasized. At a particular 
scenario, Nigerian “soldiers had complained that the insurgents outgun them as a result of more sophisticated 
weapons used by the sect members”1. Aside from claiming territories in the Nigerian States of Borno and 
Adamawa, the power assault of the sect was powerful enough to force about 500 Nigerian soldiers and refugees 
to take refuge in Cameroon. Nearly 300,000 people in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe – 70% of them women and 
children have fled their homes since early 2013. From the UN statistics, there are more than 650,000 IDPs. 
60,000 Nigerians have sought refuge in neighbouring countries since May, 2013. There are 40,000 Nigerian 
refugees in Niger Republic and about 28,000 in Cameroon2 . The affected border communities have been 
rendered exceedingly porous with Nigeria losing its place in the League of ECOWAS states3. 
 Boko Haram successes have made the security agents look inept and have also culminated in citizens 
feeling unsafe, even amid security forces4. In Judit Barna’s own words, “the crisis in the north has starkly 
revealed the weakness of the Nigerian army, long regarded as one of the most powerful in the continent”5. It has 
threatened “democratic practice and sustainable development”6. Evidently, there has been a massive decline of 
foreign direct investment (FDI) as figures from 2010 Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) annual report shows a steep 
78.1% decline in FDI7. 
 
2.0 Understanding the Nexus between the Causal and Facilitative Factors of Terrorism in North Eastern 
Nigeria 
 Nigerians are divided on the actual causes of terrorism in northeast Nigeria. According to the survey 
conducted by Centre for Research and Development (CRPD), 28.5% respondents from the north, 44.7% from the 
central and 63.0% from the south blames terrorism on religious fanaticism. Seemingly, 46.6% of the north, 
38.0% of the central and 20.8% of the southern respondents blame the scourge on unemployment; while, 9.7%, 
5.5% and 4.6% of the north, central and south respectively blame the plague on injustice. Along ethnic lines, 
15.4% Hausa-Fulani, 43.4% of Yoruba and 70.7% of Igbo blame the menace on religion. 56.4% Hausa-Fulani, 
32.8% Yoruba, and 17.3% Igbo, blame terrorism on unemployment. On religious affiliated assessment, 56.5% 
Muslim respondent blame the outbreak of terrorism on unemployment while 66.2% Christian respondents blame 
it on religious fanaticism8. This divulges the ethnic, religious and regional perceptions on the nature and essence 
of Boko Haram. 
 In light of the above, four schools of thought – religion, poverty, unemployment and conspiracy theory 
schools are prevalent. The religion school posits that Boko Haram is a product of Islamic teachings of Salafism, 
purity, perfecting the Sharia system and waging a Jihad against compromised “brethrens” and infidels. 
References are always made by the members of this school to the Muhammedian jihad (622 AD), Dan Fodio’s 
jihad (1804), Maitatsine Uprising (1980s), with Yusuf’s Boko Haram regarded as a prototype nurtured and 
motivated by the nostalgia of its predecessors. The position of this school is made more germane by the 
manifesto and demands of Boko Haram to eradicate western culture and impose Sharia on Nigeria’s northern 
states. It was based on the above presuppositions that one of the proponents of this school Austin O. Omonia 
appealed that “adherents of all religions should see beyond their narrow/parochial spheres as they embrace the 
spirit of dialogue”9. 
                                                          
1Salisu S. Shuaibu, Mohd A. Salleh & Abdullahi Y. Shehu, “The Impact of Boko Haram Insurgency on Nigerian 
National Security. International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Science, (Vol.5, No.6, 
2015).p.259. 
2Freedom C. Onuoha, A Danger not to Nigeria Alone – Boko Haram’s Transnational Reach and Regional 
Response. (Abuja: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2014).pp.7-8. 
3Onuoha, A Danger not to Nigeria Alone – Boko Haram’s Transnational Reach and Regional Response.p.9. 
4Emmanuel M. Ome & Ani Casimir, “Re-Examining Religious Insecurity in Africa State: The Menace and 
Security Challenges of Boko Haram in Nigeria”. Open Journal of Political Science, (Vol.5, 2015).p.97.  
5Judit Barna, “Insecurity in Context: The Rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria”. DG EXPO/B/PolDep/Note/2014_113. 
(2014).p.13. 
6Mashud L. A. Salawu & Ezekiel O. Adeoti, “Terrorism and Nigerian Democracy: Implications for Sustainable 
Development”. European Journal of Globalization and Development Research, (Vol.11, No.2, 2015).p.654. 
7I. C. Achumba, O. S. Ighomereho, & M. O. M. Akpor-Robaro, “Security Challenges in Nigeria and the 
Implications for Business Activities and Sustainable Development”. Journal of Economic and Sustainable 
Development, (Vol.4, No.2, 2013).p.88. 
8Arnim Langer; Amelie Godefroidt & Bart Meuleman, “Laying Bare Fault Lines: An Analysis of Student 
Perceptions of the Boko Haram Crisis in Nigeria” Centre for Research and Development (CRPD), Working 
Paper (No.50, 2016).p11.  
9Austin O. Omonia, “Religious Fanaticism and “Boko Haram” Insurgency in Nigeria: Implication for National 
Security”. Journal of Advocacy, Research and Education,(Vol.2, No.1, 2015).p.71.  
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 Another school of thought, the unemployment school blames the emergence of terrorism in northeast 
Nigeria to unemployment. Apostles of this school blame poverty as the primary instigator of insurgency in the 
north east region. They recognize that poverty rate in Nigeria increased from 54.7% in 2004 to 60% of the 
population in 2010 and that 69% of Nigerians are defined as poor1. They also sight the statistics that 8 of the 
poorest states in Nigeria are in the northeastern region with Jigawa State topping the list with 95% of its citizens 
classified as living in poverty; followed by Kebbi State with 89.7%; Kogi State with 88.6%, and Bauchi State 
with 86.3%. Kwara State is given a score card of 85.2%, Yobe State 83.3%, and Zamfara State 80.9%. Also, 
Gombe State ranks 8th with 77% while Sokoto and Adamawa States follow with 76.8% and 71.7% respectively2. 
Citations are also made to the fact that 34.5% of children are malnourished in the northeast region3. Poverty, they 
argue, trigger corruption and unemployment4. One of the adherents of the employment school, Akani, terms 
terrorism as “an offshoot of unemployment”5, claiming that frustration of unemployed youths fuels insurgency 
and terrorism6. The idleness of the youths, contend these proponents, is consequential on the Almajiric system 
which serves as “a social laboratory for [terrorist] recruits”7. It is also their opinion, and rightly so, that the Boko 
Haram conflict is being “sustained by [these] masses of unemployed youth”8. 
 Corroborating the “poverty” and “unemployment” views, Abdi Shuriye & Huud submit that:  
poverty and unemployment have therefore served recipe' for the emergence of Boko Haram 
insurgence because this has left the hopeless poor people to be used as mercenary fighters. 
What this means theoretically is that poverty and unemployment increase the number of people 
who are prepared to kill or be killed (suicide bombers) for a given course [sic] at token 
benefit9. 
 
 The political conspiracy school blames the outbreak of terrorism in northeast Nigeria on some shadow 
parties who intended to use the insurgency group to destabilize, discredit or incriminate other people, party and 
region. Ibrahim El-Zakzaky and Professor Aliyu Muhammed Bunza insinuate that Boko Haram is nothing but an 
American and Western creation with the sole motive of subjecting and ridiculing Islam10. Others such as Dr. 
Mu’azu Babangida Aliyu (former Governor of Niger State (2007-2015)), Sheikh Gumi (a renowned Islamic 
cleric) and Nasir El-Rufai (Presently the Governor of Kaduna State), on the basis of the sophisticated nature of 
their bombings, see Boko Haram as a creation to discredit the north11. Some proponents such as General Azazi 
(former NSA (2010-2012)), Sadiq Abubakar Yar’Adua (a former Lawmaker from Katsina Central), and General 
Muhammadu Buhari blame the emergence of Boko Haram on the former ruling People’s Democratic Party 
(PDP). They blame the PDP for either marginalizing the northern region of facilitating systemic corruption that 
have bred poverty and unemployment in the region12. To others such as Chief John Odigie-Oyegun (Chairman of 
the then opposition All Progressive Congress (APC)) Boko Haram sponsors “are friends of President 
Jonathan”13.  The above opinion line is captured by Besenyo, when he averred that Jonathan’s winning of the 
2011 elections; 
 
                                                          
1Ojochenemi J. David; Lucky E. Asuelime & Raquel A. Adekoye, “Is Boko Haram Poverty Driven”. African 
Renaissance, (Vol.12, No.1, 2015).p.131.  
2David, et al “Is Boko Haram Poverty Driven”.p.133.  
3David, et al “Is Boko Haram Poverty Driven”.p.135.  
4Samuel Zemve; Margaret Ingyoroko & Isaac I. Akuva, “Terrorism in Contemporary Nigeria: A Latent Function 
of Official Corruption and State Neglect”. European Scientific Journal, (Vol.9, No.8, 2013).pp.136-137.  
5A. A. Akani, “History of Terrorism, Youth Psychology and Unemployment in Nigeria”. The Journal of Pan 
African Studies, (Vol.7, No.3, 2014).p.65.   
6Akani, “History of Terrorism, Youth Psychology and Unemployment in Nigeria”.p.74. 
7Omilusi, “From Child Wandering to Guerilla-Warriors: Islamic Extremism and the Boko Haram Recruitment in 
Northern Nigeria”.pp.98-99. 
8Patricio Asfura-Heim & Julia McQuaid, “Diagnosing the Boko Haram Conflict: Grievances, Motivations, and 
Institutional Resilience in Northeast Nigeria”. CAN Analysis & Solutions, (2015).p.V.  
9Shuriye, “Global Challenge of Mutual Suspicion: Boko Haram Uprising in Nigeria”.p.110.  
10See details in Lucky Asuelime & Raquel Adekoye, “Perception of Boko Haram in Northern Nigeria and the 
2015 Presidential Election”. African Insight, (Vol.45, No.2, 2015).p.3.  
11 Asuelime & Adekoye, “Perception of Boko Haram in Northern Nigeria and the 2015 Presidential 
Election”.pp.3-4. 
12 Asuelime & Adekoye, “Perception of Boko Haram in Northern Nigeria and the 2015 Presidential 
Election”.pp.4-5.  
13 VanguadNgr, 09/02/2014. http://www.vanguardngr.com/2014/09/boko-haram-sponsors-friends-president-
jonathan-says-Chief-john-odigie-oyegun/ Retrieved 10/11/2016. 
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alienated the north, where it was believed that after Obasanjo’s long reign,  a northern 
(Muslim) president was their right…(with) a tacit agreement with the ruling PDP to that effect. 
This has created unease and irritation with the federal government in northern circles. So much 
so that even after thousands had been murdered by BH, northern political leaders urged 
Jonathan to issue an amnesty to BH’s fighters1. 
 
Former president, Goodluck Jonathan himself perceived Boko Haram as a conspiracy by some aggrieved 
elements against his government. Jonathan once declared that he “knew those behind this” and later avouched 
that Boko Haram members have infiltrated “all the arms of government” including his cabinet2.    
 For some complexities, anomalies and the opportunities availed Boko Haram to select its theatres, as 
well as the vacillating and capricious methods through which the sect chooses its targets, a thin line has come to 
demarcate the causative and facilitative realms of insurgency in the north east region of Nigeria. In fact, little or 
no attention has been granted the “cause” and “facilitative” dimensions of terrorism in north east. The “cause” is 
more often than not lumped with the “facilitator” and is generally christened “causes”.  Though both are not 
mutually exclusive and as a matter of fact manifest on the same milieu of trajectory, attempt at dissociating the 
former from the later will go a long way to justify the thesis statement of this discourse. It will also endear 
readers and policymakers to the position that the Boko Haram menace is more of an ideological fight which of 
course, is bound to be, and is already protracted – hence, a befitting strategy. 
What then is a “cause”? According the Merriam Webster Dictionary, the word “cause” in our 
perspective is defined as “to make (something) happen or exist”, “to make (someone) feel, have to do 
something”. It is synonymous with words such as “beget”, “breed”, “bring about”, “create”, “effectuate”, 
“engender”, “generate”, “induce”, “invoke”, “prompt”, “instigate”, “provoke”, “foment” etc. In the words of 
William of Ockham, “something could be construed as an immediate cause when the effect it produces occurs in 
its presence and all other things being equal fails to occur in its absence”3. A causal factor or causality of a 
particular event or action lies not just in the foundation, but also in the most primordial of its antecedents. These 
primordial antecedents serve more as the root upon which the source or trigger is identified. On such level of 
analysis, David Hume is of the opinion that cause is “an object precedent and contiguous to another, and where 
all the objects resembling the former are plac’d in like relations of precedence and contiguity to those objects, 
that resemble the latter”4. That is to say C causes E if and only if [i] C is contiguous to E [ii] C occurs before E 
[iii] All C-type events (i.e all events that are similar to C) are followed by E-type events (i.e events that are 
similar to E) [iv] upon the observation of C we experience a feeling of anticipating E5. A “cause” could reawake 
a dormant idea or better still, ignite it into motion. It could also present a factoid or basis why an abandoned 
“cause” must be resurrected. This is why David Hume further, on ideological purview, defined “cause” as “an 
object precedent and contiguous to another, and so united with it, that the idea of one determines the mine to 
form the idea of the other”6. Aptly put it, “cause” can cause or awake a “cause” or another. This is more so as 
“causes” on unique ideological lines run on a common grid. Though there could be an interruption or puncture in 
sequence of manifestation in time, place and space, the basis of justification is explicit of a common and unique 
foundation. R. G. Collingwood has rightly observed that there are three sense of the word “cause”, of which 
Sense I is historically the earliest of the three, Sense II a development from it, and Sense III a development from 
Sense II7. Of course the Senses could, in my opinion keep replicating and regenerating in perpetuity based on 
prevailing social conditions. On this level of analysis, “causes” are cognitive in sepulchers that might be 
redundant or dormant but could be exhumed and even re-exhumed. This is best summarized by Aristotle as 
“Material cause” which he defines as the material constitution of the entity, providing the passive receptacle on 
which the remaining causes act8. For as Hume as observed, “…if the first object had not been, the second never 
had existed”9. 
 A facilitator on the other hand helps “to make (something) easier” and helps “(something) run more 
smoothly and effectively”. It greases a cause and makes it easier and less strenuous than supposed. It assists and 
accelerates the progress of a cause. Just as enzymes catalyze biochemical reactions, facilitators in this 
perspective enhance the rate, pace and level of proficiency upon which a cause is advanced. Facilitators are 
                                                          
1Besenyo, “Boko Haram in Context: The Terrorist Organization’s Root in Nigeria’s Social History”.p.53.  
2Oyewole, “Boko Haram and the Challenges of Nigeria’s War on Terror”.p.258.  
3Peter A. White, “Ideas About Causation in Philosophy and Psychology” Psychological Bulletin, (Vol.8, No.1, 1990). p.4.  
4White, “Ideas About Causation in Philosophy and Psychology” p.4  
5Julian Reiss, Causation: An Opinioted Introduction. Department of Philosophy, Erasmus University , Nethelands, (2007). 
p13.  
6White, “Ideas About Causation in Philosophy and Psychology” p.4.  
7White, “Ideas About Causation in Philosophy and Psychology” p.7. 
8White, “Ideas About Causation in Philosophy and Psychology” p.3.  
9David Lewis, “Causation” Journal of Philosophy, (Vol.70, No.17, October 11, 1973). p.556.  
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stimulants and boosters which energize, support and sustain an idea or a movement. It is always in synergy with 
the environment – the political, social, cultural, economic, psychological, physical and metaphysical 
environments. The nature, logic, credence, soundness and legitimacy of a cause, an idea or a movement is never 
universal but is condemned to, and measured by the fluidity of the intercourse between it and the environment.  
Each facets of the environment as indicated above might habour it distinct influence on the central 
fabric but only in a microcosm. This is because they are all a product of a common historical process where that 
which happens in the foundation, has influence on the superstructure as well as the metaphysical. A cause, idea 
or movement therefore which exploits any of the compatibles in any of this microcosmic environment, attracts 
empathy from the others. The compatible here is in the areas of abandoned culture, defunct political structure, 
lag in religious order, and nostalgia which on the basis of present contradictions, warrants a clement desire for its 
revival by a handful of individuals, but empathy from a larger majority. Thus, a cause, idea or movement which 
is designed in this manner garners its legitimacy because it exploits on a common past but lacks the required 
pool of apologists for it is spearheaded by a handful of proponents. Since the larger population in lethargic, 
apathetic and at best, lackadaisical over the movement or ideas, the adherents capitalizes on the contradictions to 
win more “souls” since a common environmental antecedents had made them apologetic to the cause. 
In clear terms, the instigator or the “cause” of the present movement is clearly the nostalgia of the past 
reinvigorated by the few. What facilitates or what will facilitate the movement is the present contradictions 
which provide a basis for sophistries which at the realm of ideas, appeal to a segment of the apologetic 
population in a slow, haphazard but perpetual formula. Such movements for the resuscitation of the past would 
not have existed had a few [instigators/cause] not revisited the receptacles of the past [dormant cause] and the 
movement would not survive if it is not being favoured by the present contradictions [facilitators] which makes 
the gullible subscribe to the utopia of betterment through restoration the old order. The continued conversion of 
the apathetic to the gullible population supports, sustains and enlivens the movement but the mirage of 
resurrecting a utopian order remains the foundation or the root upon which the movement derives legitimacy. 
Succinctly, causal and facilitative factors exist and mingle in the same milieu but have meeting and departing 
points which is very important in our analysis of situations in, as well as profession of solutions to terrorism in 
north east Nigeria.  
 What then can be said to be the “cause” of terrorism in north east Nigeria? What is that thing in which it 
absence ceteris paribus, terrorism would not manifest in the region? What are those precedence and contiguity to 
present terror menace that resembles the later? What are the preceding ideas that are contiguous and united to the 
current terror ideology in the north east? What are the two Senses of which the current Sense III develops from? 
The answer is not farfetched! That cause is religion. The holy book of the Islamic religion sanctions a holy war 
known as Jihad. This;  
 
Jihad is a religious duty prescribed by the Qur’an and endorsed by the Sunna, or received 
tradition of the Prophet…It is the duty of every Muslim to summon the unbelievers to embrace 
Islam; if they accept the invitation then they become members of the Muslim community…if 
they refuse then they should be fought against1.   
 
 It was based on the above premise that a Fulani, Usman Dan Fodio introduced political Islamism to 
northern Nigeria and through violent disposition and insidious indoctrination, polluted the “secular” political 
climate of the region from 1804. Having declared himself the Messiah, with the claim that “he received a vision 
instructing him to ‘unsheath the sword of truth’…, began to preach that the preparation of arms is a Sunna – a 
recommended practice, sanctioned by the prophet’s usage”2. Subsequently, “he began urging his followers to 
arm themselves”3. What were they to do with the arms? Be indoctrinated with what Falola et al call a “powerful 
weapon” and “propaganda” on the juicy and amorous advantages which accompanies brutality for the sake of 
faith. The indoctrination was quite viscous that “the cause for which they fought was quite clear and for those of 
them who were religiously inclined, their longing for martyrdom made them fight ferociously”4. 
 The religious revolution by Usman Dan Fodio set precedence, became contiguous, left the region 
volatile, and became a prototype and reference point upon which the justification or legitimacy of every radical 
Islamism in the region is based.  The rebirth of the caliphate which Fodio established from his revolutionary 
escapades as well as the Sharia law which he helped enshrine has remained the foundation upon which series of 
religious related terrors have been perpetrated and perpetuated in the northern region. What would assume the 
                                                          
1J. O. Hunwick, “The Nineteenth Century Jihads” In Joseph C. Anene & Godfrey N. Brown (eds) Africa in the Nineteenth 
and Twentieth Centuries. (Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, 1966). p.292. 
2Hunwick, “The Nineteenth Century Jihads” p.295.  
3Toyin Falola, et al, History of Nigeria (Vol.2): Nigeria in the Nineteenth Century. (Ikeja: Longman Nigeria Plc., 1991). p8.  
4Falola, et al, History of Nigeria, p.14.  
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posture of Collingwood’s Sense II paradigm surfaced in the 1980s when Muhammed Marwa, based on Fodio’s 
antecedents, instigated another era of radical Islamism with the objective of enforcing Sharia on the Nigerian 
polity. Of course, it is no coincidence that the objective or ideological basis of every succeeding militant Muslim 
group right from the days of Lawan Abubakar, Muhammed Yusuf, to Abubakar Shakau, seek the return to the 
glorious days of the old where Sharia was the basis for jurisprudence. 
 Islam thus, provides that passive receptacle upon which Dan Fodio Islamism and its prototypes act. 
Here, it provides an ideology which is “an articulation of the group’s vision of the future, a vision which its 
adherents believe cannot be achieved without the use of violence”1. With this idea, they are configured into 
believing that;  
 
the superiority of God rules provides them with a feeling of justification for violating man-
made rules against violent atrocities. Doing the bidding of a higher power demands sacrifice 
but also means fewer limits on violence. It’s easier to kill if you think you are doing God’s 
will; violent is seen as necessary in order to save oneself, one’s family or even the world2.  
 
Indoctrinating such eschatology becomes the most potent weapon which of course is directly repercussive and 
reflective of the Boko Haram’s group objectives. Boko Haram thus, as recounted earlier in the work has a vision 
and objective of restoring the old order with terror strategy. The cardinal essence of the sect is that of full 
implementation of the Sharia; and that such restructuring requires regime change because a democratic and 
secular constitution contravenes and is an anathema to the law of God. Thus, amid “whatever mix of inspiration, 
Boko Haram is a sectarian movement”3. It is at a bilinear string of antagonisms with the government and 
Christianity/non-pious Muslims and its leadership is not in any way economical in declaring such vituperations. 
Abubakar Shakau (current leader of the sect) in Youtube video uploaded on January 15, 2012 avouched thus;  
 
we hardly touch anybody except security personnel and Christians…Everyone knows what 
Christians did to Muslims, not once or twice…You Christians should know that Jesus is a 
servant and prophet of God…the religion you are practicing is not a religion of God – it is 
paganism…You Christians cheated and killed us to the extent of eating our flesh like 
cannibals4. 
 
For this reason, “all Muslims in this part of the world” should obey the clarion call and “fight for the restoration 
of the caliphate of Usman Dan Fodio”. Such is the philosophy of Boko Haram and it reflects nostalgia and 
contiguity with the past. The level of indoctrination is even more tenacious but is explicit of the past. In a 
Youtube video uploaded in April 22, 2012, Boko Haram leadership reiterated that;  
 
by the grace of Allah, our main aim remains that we are killed and made martyrs in the duty of 
Allah, so we may gain the fruits of Allah’s promises to his servants as written in His Book, the 
holy Qur’an5. 
 
Thus, the eschatology of radical Islamism was, and remains the prime mover and ultimate motivator of the Boko 
Haram Sect. 
 However, “causes” are a product of, and of course, manifest in an environment. The level of 
acceptability and legitimacy of Boko Haram Islamism among the local population is not unconnected to the 
prevailing contradictions which we have labeled “facilitators”. These facilitators as recounted earlier include, but 
not limited to poverty, corruption, identity/regional politics, bad governance, perceived marginalization, 
illiteracy and lack of basic infrastructures, basic services and injustice. With those contradictions, “Individuals 
like Muhammed Yusuf were able to seize the opportunity to seek relevance by preaching an alternative platform 
for disenchanted, vulnerable youths and consequently radicalize them to attack the system which, they believe, is 
largely responsible for their situation”6. 
                                                          
1Forest, “Confronting the Terrorism of Boko Haram in Nigeria”. p.10.  
2Forest, “Confronting the Terrorism of Boko Haram in Nigeria”. p.14.  
3Montclos, “Nigeria’s Interminable Insurgency? Addressing the Boko Haram Crisis”.p.8.  
4See Konye O. Ori’s “Conceptualizing Boko Haram Victimage, Ritual and the Construction of Islamic Fundamentalism”. 
Unpublished MA thesis, Department of Communication Studies, Indiana University, (2013) for series of translated videos 
and texts from Boko Haram press releases. 
5Ori, “Conceptualizing Boko Haram Victimage, Ritual and the Construction of Islamic Fundamentalism” p.26.  
6Abeeb Salaam, “The Psychological Make-up of ‘Muhammad Yusuf’” In Ioannis Mantzikos (ed) Boko Haram: Anatomy of a 
Crisis. (Bristol: e-International Relations, 2013). p.50.  
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 We premise these contradictions to be facilitators for just as in the past, it was not, and is still not a 
peculiarity of the northern Nigeria. A juxtaposition of these ‘facilitators’ in northern Nigeria with its surrounding 
counterparts will make a travesty, and in fact raise issues in the treatise of those who refer to them as “causes”. If 
we are to analyze the poverty factor for instance, it would be obvious that it is not a prime factor. Muhammed 
Yusuf himself was of the middle class who was opulent enough to purchase a visa for his studies abroad. He 
even displayed his munificence and ostentation by building Qur’anic schools and hostels that would aid in the 
propagation of the faith. This welfare system attracted the poor and Yusuf “would often arrange cheap marriages 
for his followers in otherwise very costly environment”. Therefore, Yusuf was not wretched; hence, poverty 
could not have “caused” him to seek the return to the old order. If poverty, as it is wrongly argued, spurred up 
terrorism in the northern region, why has other wretched regions and neighbouring countries not terrorized 
themselves as a means to that recourse? It is interesting to note that the neigbouring region of Ditta in the 
Republic of Niger is much poorer, though better governed. As Montclos observes,  
 
there is no evidence that Boko Haram has particular support from the poor or is fighting for 
economic justice…within Boko Haram and its splinter groups, some elements went to 
university, including the British-born Nigerian army deserter, Aminu Sadiq Ogwuche, 
allegedly involved in the 2014 bombings at Nyanya, Abuja1. 
 
Such could be denoted of other contradictions or grievances such as corruption, perceived marginalization, poor 
governance and absence of basic facilities. By the ranking of Transparency International 2016 Global Corruption 
Index report, Nigeria notches 137and is superior to Chad Republic, Cameroon and most of its neighbouring 
countries but Niger Republic. Why is the protest strategy in most of the other countries and regions in Nigeria 
not based on religiously defined terror? It should be noted that corruption, and every other governance 
malfeasances are repercussive on all the regions in Nigeria. The militant in Niger Delta and every other region 
express their grievances in the praxis of economic pragmatism than religiosity. From governmental 
representations to distribution of national wealth, the north has been fairly treated better. Tujadeen Akanji has 
noted that 83 percent of the nation’s oil wells are in the hands of a few northern elites2. The northern region has 
produced occupants of lucrative political positions (including presidents) than any other region. Thus, if it were 
to be on the basis of contradictions, the Niger Delta and the South East should have been the epicenter of 
political terrorism. 
 More so, how do we explain a scenario where a suicide bomber detonates an explosive, shattering 
his/herself and hundred others in the process? In the strict sense of it, it could be borne of frustration, but, 
ethnographic data available have demonstrated that the push factor behind such brevity is not the desire to push 
for the correction of socio-political anomalies but that based on carefully designed religious ideological 
indoctrination. It is logical and of course incontrovertible that pauperized Nigerians are enticed into the Boko 
Haram group with peanuts; the question left unanswered is what they hope to achieve and how they intend to 
become affluent through suicide killings. Obviously, there is a cause that is feasting on the political malfeasances 
– that cause being radical Islamism. The situation illuminates a milieu in which if radical Islamism is fumigated 
in the northern region, Boko Haram as an entity loses it basis, and is strangled.  
 In a conspectus, the point here is that radical Islamism (religion) is the “cause” of terrorism in north east 
Nigeria. However, there are “arrays of environmental conditions and grievances among members of the 
population that facilitate opportunities for Boko Haram to muster support and orchestrate acts of political 
violence”3. Without the instrumentality of religion, terrorism would not have manifested. Without a favourable 
or contradictions infested environment, radical Islamism would have been bereft of apologists – that is the 
meeting point. 
 
3.0 The Impending Security Dent and the Succeeding Government’s Sanctimonious Rhetoric 
 Threatened by conundrum and instability engineered by the Boko Haram terrorists, the Nigerian 
government under former President, Goodluck Ebele Jonathan (2010-2015) reacted swiftly by promulgating a 
law which defined and proscribed terrorist act of any kind. In that regard, the 2011 Terrorist Act gave a direction 
by defining what it interdicts as; 
 
an act which is deliberately done with malice, afterthought and which, is intended or can 
reasonably be regarded as having been intended to unduly compel a government or 
international organization to perform or to abstain from performing an act seriously to 
                                                          
1Montclos, “Nigeria’s Interminable Insurgency? Addressing the Boko Haram Crisis”.p.9.  
2Tajudeen Akanji,. “Insecurity in Nigeria: The Boko Haram Dimension”. KAS International Report, (Vol.7., 2013). p.88.  
3Forest, “Confronting the Terrorism of Boko Haram in Nigeria”. p.16.  
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intimidate a population; involves or causes, as the case may be may cause serious bodily harm 
or death, kidnapping of a person, destruction of government or public utility, a transport 
system, an infrastructure facility, including an information system…1.  
 
With subsequent amendments in 2013, loopholes and legal bottlenecks were fixed and legal framework for 
combating terrorism was thus in place2. Part of the government’s response has been the declaration of a state of 
emergency in some northern states where the insurgency is thought to be most active and setting up Joint Task 
Force to end the impunity of insurgents and terrorists3. 
 Since 2012, the government has struggled to address the challenge on multiple tracts by especially 
increasing the defense budget from N100 billion ($625 million) in 2010 to N927 billion ($6 billion) in 2011 and 
N1 trillion ($6.25 billion), in 2012, 2013 and 20144. On June, 2013, the government proscribed Boko Haram and 
Ansaru, describing their activities as terrorism, and warned that any person associated with the two groups was 
liable to prosecution. Consequently, eleven (11) convictions were obtained in 2013. Also, more emphasis was 
been placed by the government on retraining personnel in urban warfare, counterterrorism and 
counterinsurgency. Personnel management was also being prioritized as well as equipment for close quarter 
combat, intelligence and amphibious operations, demolition and explosive breaching, tactical communication 
and civil-military relations5. 
 Attempts were also made at exploring the dialogue option with the insurgents. On August 2, 2011, the 
government set up eight-member committee led by Usman Galtimari, its former envoy to Chad, to study the 
Boko Haram security challenge and advise on the best approach to ending the crisis. The Committee 
recommended talks and amnesty for sect members who renounce violence. On 16 September, 2011, the former 
president Olusegun Obasanjo held talks in Maiduguri with Boko Haram members who laid out conditions for 
ceasefire. On 17 April, 2013, a Twenty-six Member Amnesty Committee headed by special duty minister Kabiru 
Taminu Turaki was formed6. Amnesty was eventually offered but without any positive result7. 
 From the early 2011, the government deployed some 3,600 personnel to Maiduguri and other major 
northeast towns as part of the Joint Task Force (JTF); a special formation of military, police and State Security 
Service (SSS) units. They were supplemented by small contingents from Chad and Niger members of Joint Multi 
National Task Force (JMNTF). Additional 2,000 troops were deployed in 2013 and further increased to 10,000 
in 2015. In August, 2014, Regional Intelligence Fusion Unit was formed in Abuja to increase intelligence 
sharing between Cameroon, Nigeria, Chad and Benin. To counter radicalization and violent extremism, Nigeria 
through Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) launched a programme in 2014 to perfect the 
human rights and security of almajiri children, reinforce peace building and conflict transformation, and develop 
youth leadership and civic engagement in northern Nigeria through English language training8. 
 The JTF has been accused of utilizing unnecessary lethal force, “gross human right violations, mass 
murder, extra-judicial killing, physical abuse, secret detentions, extortion, burning houses, and stealing money 
during raids”9. It has even been speculated that “the deployed forces operated with less than $100 million a year 
which pales against the $2 billion central allocation of the armed forces”10. Confronted with issues bordering war 
crimes, arm acquisition challenges, lack of support and hostile public opinion by affected communities, inability 
to define the root of cause of terrorism, the Chibok School Girls saga and the general politicization of the war 
against terror, President Jonathan left the scene in 2015 at the lowest ebb.  
 The emergence of the All Progressives Congress (APC) led Muhammadu Buhari’s government in 2015 
hawed a fresh breath, relaxed the tensions and enlivened the longing for the much desired victory against 
insurgency in the north east region. This was more so as the bane of the Jonathan’s administration was insecurity 
and corruption. The personality of President Buhari as a retired army general positioned him as the right man for 
the job. Prior to his election as the president, Gen Buhari had granted an interview in Abuja on February 6, 2015, 
                                                          
1Christian Akani, “2011 Terrorism Act in Nigeria: Prospect and Problems”. Online International Journal of Arts and 
Humanities, (Vol.2, No.8, 2013).p.221  
2For details, See Mu’azu A. Saulawa & Babagana Karumi, “Terrorism in Nigeria: An Overview of Terrorism (Prevention) 
Act, 2013, Amended”. International of Business, Economics and Law, (Vol.8, No.4, 2015).p.12.  
382Muhammed Sulemana, “Centenary of Failure? Boko Haram, Jihad and the Nigerian Reality”. The Australasian Review of 
African Studies, (Vol.35, No.2, 2014).pp.70-71  
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“Curbing Violence in Nigeria (II): The Boko Haram Insurgency. Crisis Group Africa Report, p.30.  
5
“Curbing Violence in Nigeria (II): The Boko Haram Insurgency. Crisis Group Africa Report, p.31.  
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“Curbing Violence in Nigeria (II): The Boko Haram Insurgency. Crisis Group Africa Report, p.23.  
7Aro, “Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria: Its Implication and Way forwards towards Avoidance of Future Insurgency” p.1.  
8
“Country Reports on Terrorism 2014”. Bureau of Counterterrorism, United States Department of State, (2015). pp.44-45.  
9Osumah Oarhe, “Responses of the Nigerian Defense and Intelligence Establishments to the Challenge of Boko Haram” In 
Ioannis Mantzikod (ed) Boko Haram: Anatomy of a Crisis. p.66. 
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vituperating that “our soldiers have neither received the necessary support nor the required incentive to tackle 
this problem. If I’m elected president…we will improve intelligence gathering…we will be tough on terrorists 
and tough on its root causes…in the affected areas”. In fact, he vowed to “lead from the front in the fight against 
Boko Haram”1. 
 Upon assuming office in May 29, 2015, President Buhari had declared his intention to end every form 
of terrorism in the north east by December, 2015. In his early days in office, he consolidated on the late victories 
of his predecessors and reclaimed a chunk of territory from Boko Haram militants. As a Fulani, an ‘insider’ and 
a onetime Boko Haram preferred assignee in a proposed negotiation with the federal government, Nigerians did 
not just consider the deadline feasible but also began to exhibit lines of serenades in anticipation for a job well 
done. Consequently, President Buhari (with a continuum in strategy) in December, 2015, informed the BBC that 
Nigeria has “technically won the war” against Boko Haram. That “the militant group could no longer mount 
conventional attacks against security forces or population centres. It has been reduced to fighting with 
improvised explosives devices (IED) and remained a force only in its heartland of Borno State”2. 
 From the figures and analysis advanced by NewWeek, the dreaded group in an attempt to nullify the 
submission of the president killed about 2,306 persons in the first quarter of 2016. The group was still vibrant 
and agile enough to pillage the village of Dalori, setting ablaze livestock and decimating over 80 peoples3. As 
Max Siollun observes, “the military successes changed Boko Haram’s threat, but didn’t eliminate it”4.  
 The above opinion and observations notwithstanding, President Buhari again in December 24, 2016, 
reiterated his grounds and “commend[ed] the determination, courage and resilience of troops of Operation 
Lafiya Dole at finally entering and crushing the remnants of the Boko Haram insurgents at “Camp Zero”, which 
is located deep within the heart of Sambisa forest”. The President revealed that “the terrorists are on the run, and 
no longer have a place to hide” hence, the soldiers should “maintain the tempo by pursuing them and bring them 
to justice” 5 . The media frenzy climaxed with the presentation of a captured flag and Qur’an purportedly 
belonging to Boko Haram leader, Abubakar Shakau to President Buhari by the Nigerian army at the Guards 
Brigade Regimental Dinner Night at the Guard Brigade Scorpion Mess, Abuja, on 30th December, 2016. 
 Henceforth, major encounters and defeats of the Islamist group became politicized and shredded in 
secrecy. The word “remnants” invaded the strategic lexicon of the nation’s defense’ press releases. Every 
encounter with Boko Haram, irrespective of how fierce it is, is ulteriorly masked since the major threat was 
defeated hence, less attention to its “remnants”. Since the expectation of the masses on the area of security is 
very high, the government is now on a spree of dishing out propaganda to modulate public opinion. It is also in a 
habit of discrediting the previous regime while sentimentalizing its present “infallible” strategy which has “paid 
off” in the fight against insurgency.  
 Yet, weeks after the superficial victory against Boko Haram, security situations deteriorated. In the first 
week of January, 2017, 15 hunters were decapitated by militants in Borno. Few days later, a military location in 
Damaturu, the Yobe State capital was attacked, culminating in the deaths of 5 soldiers. In January 8, two female 
suicide bombers struck the Kaleri area of Mafa local government of Borno State, killing 2 others. Same day, 
another 8 persons were killed and scores injured when multiple explosions hit Maiduguri, the Borno State 
capital. By Thursday January 12, Abubakar Shakau, in a video, claimed responsibility for the bomb blast that 
killed 4 persons and injured 17 others at University of Maiduguri, Borno State. The killing spree continued in 
January 13, when three bombs exploded in Madagali town of Adamawa State killing many. Same day, a suicide 
bomber detonated and killed another two persons. In mid-January, the convoy of 2nd Lt. Amajouritse was hit by a 
bomb, resulting in his and others’ deaths. Reports filtered in on January 17 of Nigerian air force “accidental” 
bombing of an IDP camp in Rann, killing more than 230 persons. Just days after, eyewitness report spoke of 
soldiers battling for hours to repel more than 100 Boko Haram militants who attacked the nuked IDP camp with 
death toll not below 15. In January 24, a patrol vehicle in Biu local government area of Borno State was 
ambushed and a police officer slaughtered. A few days later, Boko Haram attacked a military base at Sasawa 
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town near Damaturu and burnt it down. In the ensuing counter attack, 3 soldiers lost their lives. The last of the 
major attacks in January was a suicide attack on Dalori Quarters Mosque in Maiduguri, Borno State. 
 In about 14:00 local time of February 1, Boko Haram attacked a UN technical team working along the 
Nigeria-Cameroon border, killing five persons and injuring several others. In the night of February 17, scores 
were feared death as Boko Haram detonated explosives and engaged the Nigerian army in a fierce combat that 
lasted more than an hour in an IDP camp at Mafa, Maiduguri. The Nigerian army in February 10 confirmed 
Boko Haram attacks on its troops, admitting the loss of 7 soldiers. In February 17, a suicide bomber killed self 
and destroyed 13 vehicles in one detonation. On Sunday February 26, terrorists’ explosion rocked Kontagora in 
Niger State, killing 3 and injuring 4. 
 In March 14, Boko Haram released a video, showing the execution of three men the group accused of 
spying for the Nigerian military. Reports permeated the news environment on March 15 about the terrorists’ 
grand assault on the entirety of Magumeri town of Borno, forcing residents to flee to Maiduguri. On March 18, 
three suicide bombers attacked Mulai community in Jere local government of Borno, leading to the death of 5, 
and injury of 8 persons. 
 On April 7, Terrormonitor.org broadcast the video released by Boko Haram, showing their attacks on 
African forces and equipment seized from them. Same day, news carried that Boko Haram jihadists killed 4 
soldiers in an ambush near Gubdori village, Maiduguri, just a day after killing 7 civilians; in the attack, 5 
soldiers were injured while another 4 were declared missing. In April 20, Premiumtimesng reported that Boko 
Haram militants have sacked an army battalion, killing 8 soldiers; wounded 11 others and carted away several 
arms and ammunitions at Sabon Gari Base, Borno State. On Thursday 27th April, about five soldiers were killed 
and 40 injured when Boko Haram’s explosive-laden pickup truck rammed into a military convoy at Manguzum, 
Borno State. 
 On May 4, 7 persons were confirmed dead as two female suicide bombers attacked Mandarari ward in 
Konduga local government of Borno. Within hours, Abubakar Shakau released a video to dismiss claims by the 
Nigerian air force that he was injured in a recent aerial bombardment. Amidst this height of tension, aggression 
and confrontation, Boko Haram released about 82 of the kidnapped Chibok School girls in May 6. In May 13, 
Shuaibu Moni, one of the Boko Haram generals swapped for the Chibok schoolgirls, in a new video, threatened 
to bomb Abuja. On the 20th day of May, a BBC source1 disclosed that the Chibok girls were exchanged for “five 
senior Boko Haram militants” and “two million Euros in cash”. On the same day, the Islamic militants beheaded 
4 IDPs at Dalori I camp of Maiduguri. By May 24, there was a bomb blast in Amaranmati village, Maiduguri, 
leaving scores dead. 
 In June 3, the Nigerian army announced the surrendering of a wanton figure of 700 Boko Haram 
insurgents. But in June 18, multiple suicide blast hit Kofa, Borno, killing 16 and injuring 11 others. On June 20, 
supply convoy was ambushed, resulting in the death of 3 and kidnap of 16 women. On June 26, the militant 
group released a video, showing the kidnapped distraught policewomen. 
 By July 24, strings of attacks at Jekete village in Konduga local government area of Borno State 
culminated in the death of about 15 people and scores more missing. On the 28th of same month, a suicide 
bomber sneaked into an estate accommodating returning IDPs in Dikwa, and detonated explosives leading to the 
death of 14 with 24 others sustaining injuries. Generally, University of Maiduguri by 2016 had become a tourist 
attraction to terrorists’ suicide bombers, who have rained series of attacks with intensity increasing from January, 
2017. The ambushing of the NNPC oil workers remains the latest escapade of the dreaded group. 
The above feat is too glorious for a remnant of a trounced group to achieve. Obviously, the Buhari 
government has failed to be sincere to itself and the general public. Scoring of political points as well as political 
correctness has been prioritized. The genuine intention to exterminate terrorism is defeated by the intentions of 
presenting the administration as a more trustworthy, reliable and that committed to the cause of ending 
insurgency. It does not matter if the citizens are misinformed or not, the physiognomy of the administration is 
paramount. Recently (the last week of July, 2017), there was an attack in the Magumeri area of Borno State on a 
convoy of specialists from Nigerian National Petroleum Commission (NNPC). A day after the attack, the army 
claimed they had rescued the oil workers. Four days after, following the release of a video showing three of the 
abducted members of the oil exploration team by Boko Haram, the army released another statement, regretting 
the earlier propaganda of a statement. This is just one of the hundreds of stratagems to endear public opinion 
than put an end to insurgency in the north east region. The fight now is on three fronts: main fight against terror, 
fight against negative public opinion, and fight to discredit the previous administration. Unfortunately, the first 
doesn’t appear to be the priority compared to the second. For instance, trading million of dollars and incarcerated 
Boko Haram generals for a “few Chibok girls” was not a move at mitigating the security situation but that of 
proving a political point and cementing an endearing public opinion. Analysts have blamed the reinvigoration 
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and revived confidence of the dreaded sect on that gesture. The reality is that, for a few girls, hundreds have been 
sacrificed. Rhetorically asking, which amongst the two is a lesser evil? 
 Generally, both the previous administration and the present Buhari led administration appear to be 
lackadaisical to both the “causes” and “facilitators” of insurgency in the north east region. Like Jonathan, Buhari 
administration’s approach has been majorly confrontational and aggressive. Declaring victory over Boko Haram 
simply because they no longer held territories is not just ridiculous but reflects the ignorance of the Nigerian 
defense council on the nature and character of the Boko Haram struggle. Even bandits with no ideology are 
capable of reassembling and inflicting damages upon being scattered by a superior force. What then about a 
value based insurgent group? When President Buhari during his campaign promised to be “tough on terrorists 
and tough on its root causes”, one would have expected to see an overhaul of this obsolete strategy for no army 
can engage in a conventional strategy and triumph in an irregular warfare. Very little has been done so far on the 
area of deradicalization, curbing of poverty and illiteracy, and the legitimacy combat which this phase of the war 
defines. The proposed, passed and withdrawn “North East Development Commission Bill” which was designed 
to address the “facilitators” has been condemned to politicking, hence, left redundant. Who would have believed 
that up to this date, the Buhari led administration is yet to design a grand strategy at curbing insurgency in the 
north east? Of the hundreds of scholarly recommendations earlier made, we emphasize the containment strategy. 
 
4.0 What is the Containment Strategy? 
 The Soviet Union on the eve of World War II, had absorbed the three Baltic states of Lativa, Lithuania, 
and Estonia. She had also expanded to eastern and central Europe and began to impose its control upon Poland, 
Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania and Albania, even before the end of the war1. Kremlin was also active in Greece 
while pressurizing Iran and Turkey for territorial cession and naval bases in the Bosporus. All these moves were 
aggressive expansion of Soviet’s communist ideology and influence with the sole motive of subverting 
capitalism for “when a revolutionary crisis develops in America, that will be the beginning of the end of world 
capitalism as a whole”2. According to NSC 20,20/1,20/2 &20/3 and CIA Report, ORE 60-48, the Soviet were 
“waging political, economic, and psychological warfare against all elements resistant to communist purposes, 
and in particular, attempting to prevent or retard the recovery of a cooperation among western European 
countries” 3 . The United States of America, reacting to this ‘potential’ threat designed the prestigious 
containment strategy.  
Historically, containment strategy could be traced to the aftermath of the 1917 Russian Revolution 
where there were calls for western leaders to isolate the Bolshevik government. While the French Premier 
Georges Clemenceau called for a cordon sanitaire or ring of non-communist states to isolate the Soviet Union, 
Woodrow Wilson called for a “quarantine”4 as communism was perceived as a communicable disease. 
The philosophical basis for the formulation of the containment strategy was contained in George 
Kennan’s 1947 article titled “Sources of Soviet Conduct”. Kennan perceived Soviet despise of capitalism and its 
long term strategy of subverting it as a threat; a threat to be ‘contained’ through a long-term psychological, 
diplomatic, military and political means. Kennan, observing Soviet’s intransigence submitted that: 
 
…[these Soviet policies] on one hand [make it] more sensitive to contrary force, more ready to 
yield on individual sectors of the diplomatic front when that force is felt to be too strong, and 
thus more rational in the logic and rhetoric of power. On the other hand, it cannot be easily 
defeated or discouraged by a single victory on the parts of its opponent. And the patience 
persistence by which it is animated means that it can be effectively countered not by sporadic 
acts…but only by intelligent long range policies on the part of Russia’s adversaries… In these 
circumstances, it is clear that the main element of any United States policy towards the Soviet 
Union must be that of a long term, patience but firm and vigilant containment of Russian 
expansive tendencies5.  
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Such policy Kennan advised should have “nothing to do with threats or blustering or superfluous gestures of 
outward “toughness” but: 
 
the United States has it in its power to increase enormously the strains under which Soviet 
policy must operate, to force upon Kremlin a far greater degree of moderation and 
circumspection than it has had to observe in recent years, and in this way to promote 
tendencies which must eventually find their outlet in either the breakup or the gradual 
mellowing of Soviet power1. 
 
 In a swift reaction, President Harry Truman in March 12, 1947 appeared before the US Congress with 
the “Truman Doctrine” seeking $400,000,000 as aids to Greece and Turkey for “it must be the policy of the 
United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside 
pressures”2. Truman thus “proposed in effect, that America police Russia’s every borders”. The doctrine was to 
be a “declaration of economic and financial pressures” on Russia3. Another package was advanced by George C. 
Marshall to “provide a cure rather than a mere palliative” to ailing economies along Soviet cordon4. This cure, 
aside the $597,000,000 for immediate emergency relief, asked to “enter into a 4-year contract to furnish some 
$20,000,000,000 or more in money and supplies to implement the Marshall plan…the money was to worth 
$50,000,000,000 in a few years”5. 
 The Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan were crucial and historic for they signified the adoption of 
George Kennan’s containment policy. By 1947, the Congress had passed the National Security Act, which 
established the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff; provided for an Air force independence 
from the army; and created the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). By 1948, the Marshall Plan was passed by 
the Senate. In an effort to alienate and circumvent Soviet Union, Germany and Japan were assisted on  economic 
revitalization while military alliances such as North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), South East Asian 
Treaty Organization (SEATO), Middle East Treaty Organization (METO), Central Treaty Organization 
(CENTO) etc. were formed. Both the 38th parallel and the 17th parallel were designated as international boundary 
between free (capitalist) and totalitarian (communist) worlds. 
 Containment strategy in effect was “a policy of calculated and gradual coercion”6.  It was aimed at “the 
psychological malaise in countries bordering on the Russian sphere of influence that made them, and hence the 
overall balance of power vulnerable to Soviet expansive tendencies”7. Containment meant, refusing to bring on a 
full scale war with the Soviet and China, but restraining them from occupying new territory such as South Korea 
or Taiwan. The doctrine was premise on a prudent patience and would at times take bold resolve to deter 
expansion. The argument was that “so long totalitarianism was contained, in the long run it would prove to have 
more internal contradictions than liberal market democracies. In the long run, contained totalitarianism is likely 
to self-destruct than contained democracy”8.  
 Containment strategy aimed to avoid both appeasement of the USSR and a direct military confrontation, 
and thus involved the judicious use of “economic sticks and carrots, fostering competition within the world 
communist movement, engaging in diplomacy, promoting the health and vigour of capitalist democracies and 
ensuring that our attempts to combat the Soviets would not make us become more like them”, while waiting for 
communism to exhaust itself beneath the weight of its own internal contradictions9. The containment strategy 
was designed to “reduce the power and influence of the USSR to limits which no longer constitute a threat to the 
                                                          
1 George Kennan, “The Source of Soviet Conduct”. Foreign Affairs, (July, 1947. Accessed from 
http://www.foreignaffairs.org/19470701feassay25403/x/the-sources-of-soviet-conduct.html. March, 2016).  
2 Harry S. Truman, “Truman Doctrine” Address which he delivered to Congress on March 12, 1947. (Available at 
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study-collections/doctrine/large/documents/index.php?documentdate=1947-08-
12&documentid=31&studycollectionsid=TDoctrine&pagenumber=1. Accesses March, 2016)  
3 Henry A. Wallace, Speech on the Truman Doctrine, March 27th, 1947. 
(http://wwww.teachingamericanhistory.org/index.asp?document=852. Retrieved March, 2016)  
4George C. Marshall, Speech gave to the Graduating Class of 1947 at Harvard University, June 15, 1947. (Available at 
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study-collections/marshall/large/documents/index.php?documentdate=1947-06-
15&documentid=mp&pagenumber=1. Accessed March, 2016)  
5 Charles W. Vursell, Speech on the Marshall Plan, December 4, 1947. 
(http://www.teachingamericanhistory.org/library/index.asp?document=855. Accessed March, 2016).  
6Drew (ed), NSC-68: Forging the Strategy of Containment, pp.54-55.  
7John Lewis Gaddis, Strategy of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Post War American National Security Policy. Oxford, 
1982. Qtd in Andreas M. Bock, “Containment Revived: An Alternative Way to Cope with Terrorism”. Journal of Strategic 
Studies, (Vol.2, No.1, 2009). p.35.  
8John Braithwaite, “Pre-empting Terrorism”. Current Issues in Criminal Justice, (Vol.17, No.1, 2005). p.102. 
9 Lee Jones, Review of Ian Shapiro’s Containment: Rebuilding a Strategy Against Global Terror (2007). Available at 
http://www.culturewars.org.uk/2007-03/shapiro.htm. Accessed 20/08/2016.  
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peace, national independence and stability of the world family of nations”. It was to “encourage and promote 
gradual retraction of undue Russian power and influence from the present parameter area around traditional 
Russian boundaries and the emergence of satellite countries as entities independent of the USSR”1. 
 The containment strategy was highly successful. It pressurized and frustrated the USSR into submission 
in 1989. 
 
4.1 Containing Terrorism in North Eastern Nigeria 
 It is a fact of history, political science, sociology and even strategic studies that value based conflict of 
ideological wars are more often than not protracted. The cold war here is just an example out of a hundred. The 
containment strategy is remodeled here to fit the war situation and conditions in north east Nigeria. Nigeria just 
like the US (during the Cold War) is at the verge of losing not just its territory, influence, loyal citizens and 
statehood to terrorists who through indoctrination have won a large number of “zombified” elements to its 
radical Islamist cause. Western ideologies, secularism and religious tolerance are anathema to these militants’ 
teachings. Boko Haram has also raised armies, seized territories and advanced economic packages to infiltrate 
the communities they operate and thus, gain their support. Thus, what would look like the Truman Doctrine (in 
the form of physical presence), Marshall Plan (in the form of welfare and economic packages) and a strong 
intelligence network become pertinent here too to frustrate and starve the terrorists of both empathetic and active 
fan-base. 
 
4.2.1 Physical/Geographical Containment  
 Just like what Harry Truman did in the popular Truman Doctrine when he consented to physical US 
armed forces presence in the fragile European and strategic south eastern European states, the 
physical/geographical containment entails physical presence of Nigerian armed forces across strategic positions 
in north east Nigeria as defined in this work. It should be recalled that US armed forces presence at these 
strategic points was a part of the containment strategy which was a grand plan against further soviet expansion. It 
was an epitome of a well defined fortress aimed at frustrating the proliferation of the Soviet’s epidemic ideology; 
deter direct aggression, while counteracting subversion through military intelligence networks. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.1 Map Showing the Geographical Features of North Eastern Nigeria  
In redefining this strategy for its utilization in combating terrorism in north east Nigeria, geography will 
play a very crucial role. In the troubled areas, are varieties of vegetations such as Guinea, the Montane, the Sahel 
and the Sudan savannahs. Also worthy of note are the Mambilla highlands, the Lake Chad as well as the rich 
topography of the Sambisa reserve. Very importantly, natural defense endowments between ‘persistently hit 
areas’ and perceived base or safe haven of Boko Haram is to be mapped out with a corresponding threat diameter 
defined. With this, a tentative parameter for tactical conjectures can be drawn. Engagements here, as would be 
                                                          
1Drew (ed), NSC-68: Forging the Strategy of Containment. p.30.  
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discussed later, are not to be confrontational or aggressive but in synchronous of timely mobilization and sorties, 
based on concrete intelligence. 
 Presently, the Nigerian intelligence is yet to assertively define the base or safe haven of this insurgent 
group. This to a great extent will limit this plan since the definition of the base will determine the periphery 
where an encircled cordon or parameter can be established. This notwithstanding, this work hypothesizes three 
bases of Boko Haram operation – the North East Nigeria Area, the Borno-Yobe Area and the Sambisa Area. 
Based on these three surmised bases, befitting plans are defined in relations to containing further spread of 
terrorist networks, ideology, attacks, supplies, community support, fan base, recruit and apologists. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.2 Showing Formula for Physical Containment  
Consequently, freedom of movement in and outside terrorist bases, affected areas and freed/liberated 
territories is to be curtailed, monitored and regulated. As earlier mentioned, the truncation of movement to and 
outside troubled areas will checkmate further proliferation of attacks as well as starve the terrorists of supplies. It 
will also interrupt direct contact and communication between terrorist’s base and its subsidiary satellites in the 
north east region (if any). In such a milieu, reprisals should be expected since the sect would not just suffocate in 
passivity. However, such attacks against the cordons are likely to be weak and uncoordinated since it is borne of 
frustration and anger. Through preemptive actions and intelligence gathering, checkmating attacks against 
cordons and checkpoints, and on counterterrorist forces, would be less strenuous.  
Demarcated openings or entrance routes (checkpoints) to affected areas are to be heavily manned and 
armed by counterterrorist’s contingents. In a situation whereby remnants of sect members launch attacks from 
the periphery or affected area, such attack shall definitely be overpowered by counterterrorist forces and the 
fleeing sect members easily tracked down since they cannot readily retreat to their central base or safe haven. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3 Showing Formula Demonstrating the Wall Cordon System   
As illustrated by the above figures (2 & 3) and analyses, three options are available for the 
erection/establishment of a cordon: Option one - the physical armed surveillance/circumscription by the armed 
forced; Option two - the landmines confines; and Option three - concrete wall encirclement. Upon determining 
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the circumference of the affected area, any of these cordon options could be adopted with special attention to 
prevailing geographical situation and conditions.  
Option one (i.e. physical circumscription) would only be worth considering if the defined base 
measures a few kilometers. Even so, prevailing environmental and geographical features as indicated in the map 
above might be hazardous for a consistent presence or camping, hence, the first option is subject not just to the 
size of insurgent’s base but also, prevailing geographical and climatic conditions. That is to say, option two and 
three are the most feasible, reliable and strategically potent for an encircled parameter.  
The landmine cordon (Option two) system is a preferable option for arid areas and areas with rare 
settlements. Mines here, rather than physical army presence, are utilized in defining the bound between 
free/liberated areas and contained areas. For a minimal collateral damage, the mines are to be installed in a 
clearly defined and “classified” formula, properly mopped-up with up-to-date military equipment and gadgets. 
The mine technology should be that which only the echelon of counterterrorist forces possesses the technical 
know-how of defusing them. In situations whereby terrorists deploy decoys to detonate the mines, their trail 
would be easily tracked while a dispatch of counterterrorist forces at the nearest checkpoint replaces the 
exploded mines based on its original formula. Since a myriad of the Boko Haram militants (the suicide 
bombers), due to high level of indoctrination, would naturally wish to defy the mines by braving them, the 
breadth of the cordon lines as well as the swiftness of reaction to any detonation by units at the checkpoints 
should be designed and made to commensurate such circumstance. To ensure that innocent civilians do not step 
on these mines, large scale sensitization and awareness programmes should be conducted in affected 
communities with warning signs erected (with all languages of communication) along visible proximities. 
Civilians should also be encouraged to pass through their nearest checkpoint to their legitimate businesses; these 
roles will be championed by the community policemen who shall play a major role in this grand strategy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4 Demonstrating Land mine formula  
The wall cordon (Option three) is recommended for cordon along the international borders, the forest 
areas and maybe on the highland and waterlogged areas. The thickness or breath of the wall should be such that 
missiles and artillery shells cannot easily fall. The wall system should include the use of “multiple layers of 
interdependent systems which include CCTV, surveillance, security guards, [and] protective barriers,”. There 
should be a distribution of guard towers (mounted with AK47 and rocket launchers), security lights, alarm 
system, motion sensor, and drone controlled cameras. 
 Based on the preferred cordon option adopted and the total area to be covered, a decision could then be 
reached on the number of checkpoints to be established per stipulated square kilometers. In cases where 
geostrategic complications arise from geographic or climatic factors, the three cordon options could be utilized 
to attain the grand aim of containing terrorism.  Practical suggestion of the physical containment (based on 
limited information) is attempted below based on our three hypothesized epicenters. 
 
4.2.1a North Eastern Nigeria Area 
The north east Nigeria comprises the Nigerian states of Taraba (60,278 km2), Adamawa (34,532 km2), 
Bauchi (49,001 km2), Gombe (18,199 km2), Yobe (45,481 km2) and Borno (71,496 km2). The entire north east 
Nigeria covers a total land area of about 278,978km2. Geographically, the entire area possesses about five 
distinct ecological zones which may necessitate the adoption of two cordon options. The landmine option is very 
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suitable for the fortification of arid and semi-arid peripheries while the wall system is a perfect option for shrubs 
and vegetation manifested areas. Shrubs and vegetations growing on mines in vegetative zones could complicate 
formula deciphering while shrub roots could also detonate mines overtime. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5 Map showing the Total Land Area of North Eastern Nigeria 
Due to the largeness of the entire north east area, checkpoint will form a cluster in areas with thick 
population settlements while spatially distributed but heavily manned across less inhabited areas. With 
increasing porosity of the international borders bordering the north east region, the wall cordon is recommended 
across these borders since these neighbouring governments have proven their inefficiency or unwillingness at 
containing terrorist spread into their territories and curbing the proliferation of arms and supplies to terrorist 
bases via their borders.  
 
4.2.1b The Borno-Yobe Area 
 When the radicalization of the Boko Haram activities peaked in 2009, almost all the states in the north 
east region had one time suffered a hit. However, concerted effort by the government (especially on the eve of 
the 2015 general elections) had compelled the terrorist actors to retreat to the outskirts of Borno and Yobe hence, 
the inclusion of this area in the hypothesized epicenters. Aside being the ‘holy-land’ of the extremists, Borno 
remains very relevant since it was from there that the radicalization process proliferated to other states of the 
north east. Seemingly, Borno is also a home town to one of the leaders of the Boko Haram sect, Muhammed 
Yusuf. Borno (and Yobe) remains the most hit, most targeted and most affected of all the states in the region. 
 
Aside the broad based community support, terror actors in Borno and Yobe benefit from some 
geographical currencies with the most important being the porous borders of Cameroon, Chad and Niger 
Republic. Borno and Yobe area as it stands, cover an area of about 116,977km2 and is relatively diverse in 
ecological features. The northern region of the Borno-Yobe area is arid while the north east and eastern regions 
support vegetation courtesy, the Chad Basin. Proliferation of terrorist network down Adamawa is greatly 
discouraged by the terrain and some natural fortresses Adamawa possesses. 
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Fig. 6 Map Showing the Yobe-Borno Area  
 
Nevertheless, in defining a parameter for containing terrorist movement along this hypothesized 
epicenter, geography still plays a crucial role. Since the northern fringes of this hypothesized cordon are arid, the 
landmine cordon system is a perfect option. However, both the wall and mine cordon system could still be 
utilized to checkmate the high porosity of the northern international boundaries. At the north eastern half of the 
region where Lake Chad is situated, the naval presence there should be strengthened to police the river as an 
extension of other cordon options. The southeastern fringes of this hypothesized base habour some natural 
defense features. In this case, a cluster of checkpoints is to be established along these natural defense fortresses 
to filter penetrations and exits. Generally, an estimated checkpoint of about 3900 is expected to be established on 
the formula of maybe one per 3.2km2. 
 
4.2.1c The Sambisa Area  
The Sambisa area is very popular in the perturbing atmosphere of terrorist miasma in north east Nigeria. 
It is generally believed that this hypothesized epicenter is the most viable of the surmised bases of the Boko 
Haram sect. it is also assumed that it is from this forest that the terrorist actors launch their attacks. The popular 
public opinion also holds that it is in this forest that the kidnapped Chibok school girls are hid. It is also assumed 
that the Sambisa base connects the Boko Haram sects with other transnational terrorist actors. The Sambisa area 
is also believed to be one of the most vibrant supply routes of the Boko Haram sect. 
Though the Sambisa area covers a large area, including the popular Sambisa Reserve, its infested lands 
cover an area of about 2,671km2. Considering its sizable land area, applying physical containment here will be 
less strenuous. Option one would have been perfect here but for hostile ecological, climatic and geographical 
factors. By the virtue of its vegetative ecology and the porosity of the neighbouring Cameroon border, the ‘wall 
cordon’ formula is recommended. Importantly, the checkpoint formula should be in cluster and heavily manned 
and fortified. The Sambisa area is very strategic and deserves maximum attention.  
In general terms, it should be noted that part of the physical containment shall include consistent 
policing of the air space of these regions by the Nigerian air force to keep surveillance and counter attempts at 
directly airlifting supplies to the terrorists by their shadow relations. Aviation control agencies shall also focus 
their satellite on identified epicenter, detect, identify, warn and shutdown unauthorized flight or drones 
movements around cordoned area. 
As earlier stated, the aim of physical containment is not aggression but to filter movements into and out 
of ‘troubled’ areas. In this process of filtering, weapons and other personal effects terrorists need for sustained 
assault and coordinated attacks are trapped. This in a short while, if properly executed will starve the terrorists 
out of supplies, thereby forcing them into submission.  
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Fig. 7 Map Showing the Sambisa Area  
However, in the case of emergency and attack within the cordoned area, a contingent from the nearest 
checkpoint is to be dispatched to quickly annihilate the remnant of the terrorists whose uncoordinated attack by 
now will be borne out of frustration and desperation for survival. In-camp arrangements and secret billeting is 
also a good option within cordoned areas. As stated earlier, upon intelligence, preemptive raids, strikes, arrests 
and covert actions can be launched to foreclose and neutralize terrorist threats within a cordoned areas.  
 
4.2.2 Economic/Ideological Containment 
 During the Cold War days, billions of dollars were pumped into the western European economies by the 
US to stabilize their economies, boost their GDP and GNP, empower the private sectors and revitalize the 
destroyed economies. This attempt was to ensure that an enabling environment was created for capitalism to 
flourish thereby, dissuading the masses of the need for a socialist revolution. It is imperative to note that aside its 
economic significance, the Marshall Plan had an added psychological impetus on the US anti-communist 
struggle and facilitated a pro-US public opinion in the countries which the Plan was advanced. It instigated the 
feelings, emotions and sentiments of ‘love’ expressed by a capitalist giant, hence preference of capitalism; while 
escalating the hatred for the authoritative, repulsive, repressive, and rigid Soviet Union cum communism. It was 
therefore easy for America to manipulate and garner domestic support from these ‘frontier’ states they showed 
‘love’ to. The assumption is that without the economic intervention, the masses would not have been 
successfully alienated from the Soviet’s ‘pathological’ ideology. 
 The situation in north east Nigeria is by far worse than the post-world war II economic situation in 
Western Europe. Poverty and unemployment rate is at an astronomical level. Majority cannot afford a square 
meal while chunks of the population survive by begging along the major streets. Mortality rate is very high; 
diseases and malnutrition have led thousands of children to their early sepulcher and life expectancy rate is very 
low. Wealth is concentrated in the hands of a few while the teeming majority wallow in abject poverty. The 
above situation is compounded by the fact that a good number of the populations are illiterates. This situation has 
culminated in shallow, parochial and untamed mindsets, desperateness; and has facilitated an enabling 
environment for self-declared jihadists to radicalize and recruit a good number for their selfish agenda. This 
limbo and dent in governance generates a picturesque of “collective grievance” for the radicals to point accusing 
fingers at the government. The government thus is presented as the “culprit” while terror is seen as “morally 
justifiable as well as efficient tool for redressing the grievances”. With this “collective grievance” culminates an 
ideology articulated by a charismatic vanguard which provides a “logical” external cause (being the government) 
for the members dissatisfaction and frustration. This helps promote “us versus them” social psychology hence, 
fluidity in recruitment.  
 Thus, upon defining an area for physical containment, a welfare package should be introduced into the 
cordoned area to service infrastructures, advance loans, aids and grants for small and medium enterprises, 
mortgages, workshops and programmes on entrepreneurship advancement, free and compulsory education to 
university level, agricultural grants and trainings on new technologies and breeds; and a close relationship 
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between the governors and the governed.  The Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) centers should be 
transformed to talent and skills hunting centres where displaced people with outstanding skills are assisted to 
rehabilitate themselves. This gesture will garner loyalty and support for the Nigerian state while alienating the 
people from the terrorists’ cause. Even some terrorists who joined based on these arrested grievances would have 
cause to switch loyalty. This feeling of ‘love’ expressed by the government towards the people in the cordoned 
region shall incur a spillover effect of massive alienation of the terrorists’ cause by their hitherto apologists 
overtime. Immediately the terrorist actors cease commanding full support from communities it operates, the seed 
of their destruction is sown for intelligence will ram in like tsunami. Similarly, prevailing utterances such as “the 
government do not care”, “they have forgotten us”, “we are left to suffer and die”, “our religion/region is 
marginalized”, “this infidel state system is not working”, “this kind of injustice cannot prevail in a caliphate”, 
etc. will die a natural death. Seemingly, once individual disaffections are ameliorated, it will reduce people’s 
readiness to buy into terror warranting ideologies. For as observed by Kruglanski et. al., uncritical adoption of 
war only “may temporarily hamper terrorists’ ability to launch attacks without substantially altering their 
motivation to do so”1. Enough force has been displayed already; what is needed now is authority. For as 
Freeman observes, “sole preoccupation with force misses the opportunities of authority”; for “force may for a 
moment provide complete control but the instability of such control requires that either it is renewed 
continuously or else transformed, through the strategist’s art, into authority” 2 . That is exactly what this 
subheading represents. War can therefore disrupt terrorists’ capacity but not their intent. A little of “carrot” and 
“stick” can however disrupt both the terrorist capacity and intent to terrorize. Therefore, this “irregular warfare”3 
in the cordon area is a war for loyalty, influence, legitimacy and relevance over the cordoned population. 
However, conflict sensitive development planning should be consummated to ensure that bounties do not fall 
into the wrong hands as that would culminate in a vicious circle strategic boomerang of intentions.   
 
4.2.3 Deradicalization, Intelligence Gathering and Community Policing 
 Deradicalization, community policing and domestic intelligence gathering play eminent role in the 
attainment of the aims of this grand strategy. Deradicalization has to do with the adoption of various means and 
techniques to derail, curtail or moderate a person or persons who hold extreme political, social or religious 
views. Boko Haram terrorist actors are radicals and extremists who crave for an Islamic state where pious 
Muslim practices will be enforced and every forms of western influence suppressed. This had been the position 
of Boko Haram leaders such as Mohammed Yusuf and Abubakar Shakau. 
 Deradicalization thus, is an integral part of this grand strategy. In the cordoned area, efforts are to be 
made at employing the services of itinerant Muslim psychologists who are vested in Koranic knowledge to 
convince “faithfuls” on the need for tolerance, moderation and adjustment with time. Koranic verses that 
encourage violence should be countered with those verses that preach peace, love, brotherhood, tolerance and 
moderation. After all, Islamic scholars such as John Eposito has insisted that the “sword verses” used in 
justifying jihadism “is not found in the Quran, or in major prophetic traditions” but rather, “a later interpretation 
of the Quran and Islamic law, developed by late eighth/ early ninth century religious scholars…”4. Progressive 
Imams should also be encouraged to propagate the message of peace and the fact that “Allah is all powerful” and 
does not need anyone to fight on his behalf. Radical and intransigent Imams should be surreptitiously watched 
and covertly “retired” by the infiltrating intelligence networks. The assumption, believe and “perception that war 
on terror is a war against Islam as is currently perceived by many in the Muslim world should be reoriented”5in 
cordoned areas. The most driver of radicalization – a search for glory and thrills should also be tactically 
devalued: “terrorist acts must be stripped of glory and reduced to common criminality” 6 . As part of the 
deradicalization process, arrested or decimated terrorist should not be publicized or tagged “major victory”. 
Extolling arrested or slain terrorists decorate them as “heroes” and “martyrs” of the “revolution”. The effect is 
that such arrested or slain terrorist may be reverenced as role model by undecided apologists. 
                                                          
1Arie W. Kruglanski et al, “What should this Fight be called? Metaphors of Counterterrorism and their Implications. 
Psychological Science in the Public Interest (Vol.8, No.3, 2008). p.97.  
2Lawrence Freeman, “Strategic Studies and the Problem of Power”. In Thomas G. Mahnken & Joseph A. Maiolo (eds) 
Strategic Studies: A Reader. (Oxon: Routledge, 2008).p3. 
3
”Irregular warfare is defined as a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the 
relevant populations… It favours indirect and a symmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and 
other capabilities in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will” See Samuel L. Ashley, “Irregular Warfare as a 
Containment Strategy – Afghanistan” (Civilian Research Project, US Army War College, Pennsylvania, 2012).  
4John I. Esposito, “Islam and Political Violence”, Religions, (vol. 6, 2015). p.1070.  
5Lora S. Aggour, The Strategy of Containment in Fighting Terrorism. (California: Centre for Contemporary Conflict, n.d). p.4  
6Marc Sageman & Richard A. Clarke, “A Strategy for Fighting Islamist Terrorists”. The American Academy of 
Political and Social Science, (618, Annals 223, 2008). p.5. 
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 Promising youths from cordoned areas should be recruited into the police and intelligence units and 
allowed the prerogative of gathering intelligence and policing their communities. Their frequency, familiarity 
and knowledge of their enclave is indicative of the advantage they possess pertaining to when and where to 
amass intelligence. This category of police and intelligence officers shall play prominent role in the infiltration 
of Mosques and Madrassas. Also, “repented” terrorists upon confirmation of deradicalization can be used either 
as baits or mole to infiltrate innermost core of terrorist camps. Their confessions and cooperation can be vital in 
decrypting hitherto puzzles. Arrested sect members could also be systematically bug with tracking and 
transmitting device and “allowed” to escape. Through this means, infiltration of terrorist camps is made easier. 
Moreso, suspected phone lines in the cordoned area are to be constantly monitored, diverted and intercepted 
when necessary. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 8 Demonstrating the Grand Containment Strategy  
With physical containment checkmating aggression and movements in and out of cordoned area; 
economic and welfare package boosting loyalty and support to the government; and the intelligence frustrating 
terrorist choreography in the cordoned area, terrorism in a few years shall be a thing of the past. Yes, few years! 
As long as Boko Haram’s sponsors remain top secret and the ideological theme neglected, the war against 
insurgency will be and has already become a protracted one.  
 
4.3 Why Containment? 
 It has become glaring that the struggle between the Nigerian government and terrorist actors in the 
north east region has become a protracted one. The war has maturated from a mere fight against bandits to a war 
of ideology, war for loyalty, struggle for influence, public opinion control and war of legitimacy. It doesn’t 
matter again how many terrorists are decimated daily but how many vectors of radical Islamists are freed or won 
from indoctrination. Suicide bombing has quadrupled in 2017 with clear indications that more are ready to lay 
down their lives for the values and ideals they uphold.  
Terrorists ideology, argued Hardin & Higgins is “based on a set of wider cultural values that they are 
expressing in practice. These are the values of radical Islamist ideology that has been growing in popularity over 
the last several decades and that generates a continuing supply of recruits to terrorism, including suicide 
terrorism…”1. Hence, the retrogressive strategies adopted by the federal government at different stages of the 
conflict has created many “widows”, “widowers”, “orphans” etc. Frustrations of losing loved ones had 
aggravated the “collective grievance” which had garnered a pool of supporters and sympathizers to the terrorists’ 
cause.  
 In light of the above, outright usage of force (as practiced by the Nigerian government) will be highly 
superfluous and retrogressive overtime. Force will only truncate terrorist’s capacity to wreck terror, not its 
intentions to do. Exclusive force will also swell the pool of terrorist supporters and sympathizers. Naked force is 
                                                          
1C. D. Hardin & E. T. Higgins, “Shared Reality: How Social Verification Makes the Subjective Objective”. In R. 
M. Sorrentino & E. T. Higgins (eds) Handbook of Motivation and Cognition. (New York: Guilford Press, 1996). 
pp.28-84. 
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neither a solution to the “causes” nor the “facilitators” of terrorism in the north east region. Thus, attention needs 
to be granted the root (which is ideological indoctrination) as well as the facilitators (which are the grievances) 
in a direct and simultaneous proportion. This is actually what this containment strategy stands for. The war, as 
earlier mentioned, has become a protracted one with a concomitant psychological repercussion. It is now the 
time for the Nigerian government to instill the level of trust and patriotism that will be strong enough to induce 
citizens into dying for it too in affected areas. This work has outlined how that can be achieved through a 
coordinated grand strategy. Therefore, to stamp out terrorism from its root, the grievances facilitating the 
proliferation of its ideology, fan-base and recruitments, justification for attacks and acceptability/legitimacy in 
the communities terrorists operate, must be looked into. 
 
5.0 Concluding Remarks 
The Nigerian government has failed to quell terrorism in the north eastern region simply because it has 
failed to identify or acknowledge the potency or role of ideological indoctrination as the key factor that has 
escalated and sustained the bewildering situation in north east. The average argument is that terrorism in the 
north east region is a product of government’s failure in upholding its part of the social contract it entered with 
the north easterners. This position is partly true. Government’s failure in the region is not the cause of terrorism 
but rather, its facilitator. This position has been discussed earlier in this work. Nevertheless, this work does not 
in anywhere, seek to downplay the place of the “facilitators” in the perturbing Boko Haram escapades. In fact, 
they are inevitable for the continued recruitment and sustenance of the terror group activities. However, just like 
a tree, the “facilitators” create a livewire and source of energy to the mainstream tree. Hence, attacking the 
facilitators only (which the government has not) is like pruning a branch whereas, other branches exist for the 
tree to tap energy through. Thus attention must be given to the root (which in this case is the ideology) as well as 
the leaves (which in this case are the grievances) in synchronism. The strategy needed here is that which will not 
just address grievances, but deactivate ‘activated’ adherents. 
This work thus remodels the defunct containment strategy for the Nigerian armed forces to adopt at the 
tactical level. This strategy as designed in the work envisages the war against terror in north east Nigeria to be a 
protracted, ideological and irregular warfare. The model, rather than being aggressive and confrontational is 
proactive and reactionary and is a combination of calculated force, welfare, intelligence and deradicalization in a 
cordoned/troubled area. The idea of the strategy is to circumvent terrorists, deprive them of fan base, community 
support, supplies, communication, and readily apologetic populations for outright recruitments. The strategy is 
also designed to limit direct confrontations while the terrorists are starved out or frustrated to giving up on their 
evil agenda. The combo of encirclement, welfarism and deradicalization is expected to augment a psychological 
spillover of increased loyalty to the government and direct alienation of terrorist cause by peoples of affected 
communities. This strategy is inevitable as outright direct confrontation (as practiced presently by the Nigerian 
armed forces) only incapacitate the terrorists, but not their intent to terrorize. We therefore recommend that the 
postulations of this work be given priority by the Nigerian government. 
 
